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WORDS OF INIIERITANCE IN DEEDS OF LAND IN
SOUTH CAROLINA: A TITLE EXAMINER'S GUIDE
DAVID H. MZANS*
INTRODUCMON
This article t is a discussion of the effect of the omission of the
word "heirs" in a deed of land in South Carolina. The purpose
is practical, not historical, it being written with the needs of the
title examiner and title advocate in mind, rather than from the point
of view of the legal antiquarian. As for its practical aspect, for-
tunate is the South Carolina lawyer who, having examined titles,
has never been confronted with a limitation in a deed which raised
a question in his mind as to whether or not it was sufficient to con-
vey an estate in fee simple.
Such questions are not daily occurrences, of course, as no com-
petent practicing attorney in South Carolina would attempt a con-
veyance in fee simple to a natural person by deed without the inclu-
sion of the word "heirs." But not all deeds have been or are drawn
by competent practicing attorneys, or on deed forms containing
printed words of inheritance, and with annoying frequency the title
examiner is confronted with the problem of off-brand limitations in
the chain of title. In many instances the question proves to be
immaterial. Possibly it is easier to get a corrective deed than to
expend time and effort in a lengthy study of the sufficiency of the
limitation. Perhaps lapse of time or subsequent descent of the fee
to the grantee by intestacy has eliminated all danger. If such an
easy solution is found, there is no need for further concern. How-
ever, in other situations no simple escape is available, and the unhappy
title examiner is squarely confronted with the question, is this limi-
tation sufficient to pass the fee; is it so indisputably good that no
subsequent title examiner will raise the question, and thus put my
client to the expense of litigation, and me to possible embarrassment?
If the limitation is clearly good under our cases, there is no difficulty;
it is only the doubtful ones which can cause trouble, if the title is
passed. On the other hand, if the deed is defective there still re-
OAssociate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, School of Law.
M'he article was planned and in large part written in a seminar under Professor A.
,ames Casner at the Harvard Law School. The writer is indebted to Professor Casner
or his help in the organization and development of the subject matter. It was read by
Charles B. Elliott. Professor Emeritus, and by Coleman Karesh, Professor of Law, of the
Law School of the University of South Carolina, both of whom contributed valuable
suggestions.
1
Means: Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land in South Carolina: A Title
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTPMLY
mains the question of what can be done by way of salvage if
representing the "owner" desirous of curing his title, or if represent-
ing a buyer insistent upon acquiring the land. This paper seeks
to supply answers to these questions from the South Carolina cases
in so far as the Court has been confronted with them, and from
the cases of other jurisdictions where no South Carolina authority
has been- found. It is here pointed out that a complete digest of
the State's many cases has not been attempted, but it is believed
that the selected cases herein cited reflect the present state of the law.
The problem today has become almost peculiarly a South Carolina
one, for in England, 1 as in the vast majority of the American juris-
dictions,2 the word "heirs" is no longer necessary in a deed to create
an estate in fee simple. Either through inertia or by virtue of a
superior insight into the needs of a modem society, however, South
Carolina has clung to the faith of the fathers, so that with but few
1. Law of Property Act of 1925 (15 Geo. V, c. 20, § 60, Subsec. 1). The
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act of 1881 (44 & 45 Vict., c. 41, § 51)
had only provided that the words "in fee simple" were sufficient words of limi-
tation. For a discussion of the effect of the Law of Property Act of 1925 see
1 EmmEr oN Trr.ES 484 (13th ed. 1949).
2. After stating the common law rule as to the requirement of words of in-
heritance in a deed to a natural person, the Restatement of the Law of Pro-
perty, 1948 Supplement, § 27, Special Note, thus states the status of the rule
in the United States as of January 1, 1947: "The rule stated in this Section
as to deeds has been wholly or partly supplanted as to deeds by a prospectively
operating statutory rule in all states except Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, South Carolina and Vermont. . . . Normally these
statutes leave all deeds executed and delivered prior to the enactment of the
statute, to be construed under the nonstatutory rule stated in this Section. The
rule stated in this Section never existed in Louisiana. In New Hampshire the
rule stated in this Section has been eliminated by judicial decision. Dicta in Ver-
mont make it uncertain as to whether that state has, or has not eliminated this
rule by judicial decision (see Blair v. Blair, 1940, 10 A. 2d 188, 111 Vt. 53)."
See also 2 Powa., REAL PROPERTY §§ 184, 185 (1950).
The ex cathedra dogma of the American Law Institute that the common law
rule is still law in the United States in the absence of statute does not represent
the unanimous view of the Institute's Advisers. See RESTATEMENT PROPERTY
TENTATIVE DRA1T No. 1, EXPLANATORY NoTEs. The case of the dissenters is
thus stated by Professors Casner and Leach (CASNER AND LEAcH, CASES AND
TEXT ON PROPERTY, 1950, p. 270, n. 1) : "The Restatement of Property, § 27,
states the old rule. This has been the subject of no little raillery at American
Law Institute meetings, chiefly by Circuit Judge (formerly Dean) Charles X_
Clark. The sponsors of this section agree that it is no longer law anywhere
except South Carolina, and there is a suspicion that if the issue now arose
in South Carolina the courts would reject it."
The American Law of Property states the present applicability of the rule
in American jurisdictions as follows: "Since New Hampshire and Vermont
have abolished the common law rule requiring words of inheritance in inter
vivos conveyances by judicial decision, the only states in which the common
law rule may still possibly exist are Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine and South
Carolina. There are no definitive cases passing on whether or not the rule
exists in Connecticut and Louisiana, leaving only two states, Maine and South
Carolina, where the courts recognize and apply the rule as present law." 1
A7mRicAw.LAW 0P PROPERTY § 2.4, p. 85 (1952).
2
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exceptions the counsel of Littleton3 to his fellow conveyancers of
the fifteenth century is sound legal advice in the State today.
Further, a quick solution to the problem is extremely improbable.
The Court has repeatedly recognized that the requirement of words
of inheritance is a rule of law, and as such is to be abolished only
by act of the Legislature.4 Thus no outright repudiation by decision
is to be anticipated. Any change by legislation possibly will not
attempt a retroactive effect, even assuming such legislation to be con-
stitutional.5 There seems no likelihood of such a statute being held
declarative of the existing law and therefore retroactive, as was
done in determining the effect of the Statute of 18246 abolishing the
3. See p. 317, infra.
4. "This is the rule of the common law from which the Courts can not escape,
though its operation nearly always results in the injustice of defeating the in-
tention of the parties. The rule serves generally as a snare to those unlearned
in technical law, and it would be difficult to suggest any reason for its continued
existence; but it has been so long established in this State that the Courts can
not now overrule the cases laying it down without imperilling vested rights.
... It was made inapplicable to wills by the first section of the Act of 1824 ....
The General Assembly has not, however, seen fit to extend this statute to deeds,
and the Courts are powerless to do so." Mr. Justice Woods in Sullivan v.
Moore, 84 S. C. 426, 428, 65 S. E. 108, rehearing denied 84 S. C. 426, 66 S. E.
561 (1910), quoted with slight changes in McMillan v. Hughes, 88 S. C. 296,
299, 70 S. E. 804 (1911); Holder v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 248, 91 S. E. 97
(1917).
5. The Florida Act of 1903 was amended in 1925 to give it retroactive
effect. The existence of the constitutional question raised by the amendment
"was recognized but a decision thereof declared not then necessary in Reid v.
Barry, 93 Fla. 849, [112 So. 846] (1927). No decision upon these two prob-
lems of statutory construction has been given by the Supreme Court of Florida
down to January 1, 1936. In Illinois, the Court seemed to assume the validity
of this retroactive provision in litigation involving an 1886 deed of Florida
land, Brelie v. Klafter, 342 Ill. 622 [174 N. E. 882] (1931)." RMTATSmNT,
PROPERTY § 39 Spec. n. 1 2. For an expression of doubt as to the constitution-
ality of such a statute, see 2 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 184, pp. 28, 29.
The primary purpose of this paper is a discussion of the existing state of the
law, rather than a study of the potentialities and mechanics of legislative re-
form of the land law. However, the query is made whether or not a properly
drawn statute might not in some instances be given a retroactive operation to
cure the effect of the omission of words of inheritance in deeds executed and
delivered prior to the passage of the statute. Would not this be constitutional
in those instances where the intention to convey the fee is apparent in the deed,
and the rights of innocent third party purchasers for value without notice are not
affected? See Bayse, Streamlining Conveyancing Procedwtre, 47 Micn. L. Rzv.
1097, 1122 et seq. (1947); Note, 57 A. L. R. 1197 (1928). Before legisla-
tive reform is undertaken, it will be wise to explore fully the possibilities of
curative statutes, as well as the marketable title acts of the mid-western states.
See Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 Micxr. L. Rev. 185
(1951) ; Spies, A Critique of Conveyancing, 38 VA. L. Rzv. 245, 259 (1952) and
the articles therein cited. Even assuming such a retroactive statute can be made
legally valid, however, its practical value is a further factor to be considered.
6. The first section of the Act of 1824 (6 Stat. 237) reads as follows:
... [N]o words of limitation shall hereafter be necessary to convey an estate
in fee, simple, by devise, but every gift of land by devise shall be considered
as a gift in fee simple, unless such a construction be inconsistent with the
will of the testator, expressed or implied."
3
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requirement of words of inheritance in a devise. Thus it is quite
possible that for the lives of all living title examiners, if not for
twenty-one years thereafter, "heirs" will remain the magic word in
the validation of paper titles in South Carolina.7
The vestigial character of the rule is the writer's explanation for
including much that appears - and is - fusty and pedantic. For
better or for worse, the South Carolina conveyancer is governed
by a rule which antedates the discovery of America, and where the
Court has not ruled to the contrary, he must look for the law as
Subsequent statutory compilations omitted the word "hereafter," and with
this omission and immaterial changes in verbiage and punctuation the statute
appears as § 19-232, S. C. CODE or LAWS (1952).
The confused history of the necessity of words of inheritance in a devise of
land in South Carolina is thus stated by Johnson, Justice of the then newly
formed (December, 1825) Court of Appeals, having jurisdiction of both law
and equity appeals, in Peyton v. Smith, 4 McC. 476, 477 (S. C. 1828): "In
Hall v. Goodwyn and Moore, 2 Nott and McCord 383 [S. C.], decided in
May 1820, the Constitutional Court held, that a devise of lands without words
of inheritance or perpetuity, vested only a life estate; and the case of Jenkins
v. Clement and Deas, Harper's Eq. Rep. 73 [S. C.], decided in 1824, the Court
of Appeals in Equity, in the construction of a clause in this identical will,
expressed in precisely the same terms with that now under consideration, held
unanimously, that the devise passed a fee, although there are no words of per-
petuity or inheritance, and laid down the rule broadly that a general unquali-
fied devise of lands, vested a fee simple. The two Courts were at variance on
several other important points of law, and the right of parties depended more
upon the tribunal before which they were investigated, than any settled rule.
This was an evil growing out of this double system of jurisprudence, and was
too grievous to be long borne by the community, and the legislature as a par-
tial remedy, undertook by the Act of December 1824 to fix a rule and declare
the law in most or all of the questions on which the two Courts had differed."
The issue in Peyton v. Smith, s.npra, was whether the statute was retrospec-
tive in operation so as to govern in a suit at law where the will had been drawn
and the testator had died before the passage of the act. By unanimous decision
the Court held that the act controlled the construction of the will, although
both at the time the will had been drawn and at the time the testator had died
the rule of the law courts had been in opposition to that of the statute. In an
opinion per Mr. Justice Johnson the Court ". .. concede[d] fully the principle
that in general the legislature cannot prescribe and establish a new rule, and
give it retrospective operation. But I apprehend that where the rule is un-
ascertained and unsettled, it belongs to the legislature to ascertain and settle the
law, and that from necessity such a law must operate both prospectively and
retrospectively . . . . Before the Act of 1824, the rule which prevailed in the
Courts of Equity gave him the fee simple, and that which obtained in the
Courts of law a life estate only. The respective Courts were equally supreme
and independent in their respective departments, and each were [sic] governed
by their [sic] own rules, but there was no common rule. The law of the land
was unsettled and unascertained, and the Act of 1824 was notoriously intended
for that purpose. It is the fiat of the people acting through their representa-
tives, as umpire between the clashing opinions of the two Courts, and must
therefore be permitted to operate not as a new rule, originating in the Act
itself, but as a rule of the common law."
7. At pp. 370, 371, infra, a solution of the problem of the requirement of words
of inheritance is suggested, which if adopted, as a practical matter can end the
tyranny of the rule almost immediately.
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it existed in the times of Litdeton,8 of Coke,9 and of Blackstone.' 0 Of
course, all of the hoary technicalities elaborated in these authorities
do not represent the present state of the South Carolina law.
Communis error facit jus. In estimating the strength of an arbi-
trary rule today existing wholly without modem justification, the
fact that the practice has not in all respects complied with obscure
technicalities is a very real influence in determining the decisions of
a court. It is hard to conceive of a modem judge, even while in
the main observing the rule, paying heed to certain of the more
meticulously elaborated distinctions of Littleton and Coke. In its
broad application the rule does survive, however, which is a red flag
warning the title' examiner to tread cautiously when not clearly with-
in the beaten path.
The development of this article is first, the rule and its require-
ments as it once existed in England, and theoretically exists today
in South Carolina; second, the exceptions to the rule, including cer-
tain new exemptions which have been developed by the Court of
South Carolina; third, the steps that can be taken to correct the
title, once it has been determined to be defective because of non-
compliance with the rule. The final chapter is a brief consideration
of certain remedial steps which may furnish a guide for future action
if the State ever elects to abandon the magic word standard.
CHAPTER I.
THE RULE AND ITS RVQUIRE"MENTS10a
The Magic Words
The classic statement of the rule is by Littleton," writing in the
fifteenth century:
"For if a man would purchase lands or tenements in fee
simple, it behooveth him to have these words in his purchase,
To have and to hold to him and to his heirs: For these words,
his heirs, make the estate of inheritance. For if a man purchase
lands by these words, To have and to hold to him forever; or
by these words, To have and to hold to him and his assigns
forever; in these two cases he hath but an estate for term of
8. Thomas Littleton, 1427-1481.
9. Edward Coke, 1552-1633.
10. William Blackstone, 1723-1780.
10a. As to the establishment in the thirteenth century of the rule requiring
words of inheritance to convey a fee, see 1 AmERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 2.3, p. 82.
11. L rrTiOm, TENURs § 1 (Wambaugh ed., 1903).
5
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life, for that there lack these words, his heirs, which words.
only make an estate of inheritance in all feoffments and grants."
Note well the cabalistic formula which must be complied with-
to "A and his heirs."'12 Certain scrivener's errors, frequently found
either in original deeds or their records, raise interesting questions.
"To A and his heir [singular] and assigns." Should the title be
passed? Not if one heeds the counsel of Coke: 13 ". . . for if a.
man give land to a man and to his heir in the singular number, he
hath but an estate for life, for his heir cannot take a fee simple by
descent, because he is but one, and therefore in that case his heir shall
take nothing." No South Carolina case has been found, but it is
believed that the Court undoubtedly would hold such a conveyance
to be one in fee simple.
14
And what of the frequently found limitation, "to A and ............
heirs and assigns." Such limitation is regularly passed without ques-
tion in South Carolina, and, in accord with the authorities, 15 would
appear to be good. More questions are raised if the limitation is.
to two or more persons "and ................ heirs and assigns." In Coke's
opinion 16 the latter is clearly bad, but in view of the many clericar
errors and omissions in our records it is highly improbable that the-
quantum of an estate would be held to turn on such a common
omission.
Suppose that instead of the conjunctive and, the disjunctive or is
used, so that the limitation reads "to A or his heirs." At an earlier
period the limitation would have been bad, the grantor taking but
an estate for life.17 As early as the middle of the eighteenth century,
however, an English judge 18 was of the opinion that the word "or"
12. "In practice, the additional words, AND ASSIGNS FOREVER, are,
and long have been, in common use; but it is beyond doubt that, though harm-
less, they are, and always were, superfluous." CHALLUS, REAL PROPERTY 221
(3rd ed.). See also 2 PREsToN, ESTATES 3.
13. Co. Limt. 8b.
14. 4 KENT 5, n. (b); AiGLER, CASES ON TirEs 528, n. 2 (3rd ed. 1942)
7 THoMpsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 3535; RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 27, com-
ment c.
15. Co. LiTr. 8b; RtsTATE1xNT, PROPERTY § 27, comment c. Cf. Johnson v-
Barden, 86 Vt. 19, 83 A. 721 (1912).
16. Co. Lirr. 8b: "If a man give land unto two, to have and to hold to them.
two et haeredibus, omitting suis, they have but an estate for life, for the un-
certainty; whereof more hereafter in this section. But it is said, if land be-
given to one man et haeredibus, omitting suis, that notwithstanding a fee simple
passeth; but it is safe to follow Littleton." Cf. Johnson v. Barden, 86 Vt. 19,
83 A. 721 (1912). But see RESTATE ENT, PROPERTY § 27, comment 1.
17. Co. Lrrr. 8b: "Also observable is this conjunctive (et). For if a man.
give lands to one, to have and to hold to him or his heirs, he hath but an estate
for life, for the uncertaintie."
18. Lord Hardwicke in Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. Sr. 409 (1749).
6
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might be construed as a clerical error for "and." Today it seems
likely that our Court would adopt the practical view of the Massa-
chusetts Court 19 when confronted with the question: "And as to
the construction contended for, although it is supported by a dictum
of Lord Coke's, it is a strictness not to be tolerated at the present
day. The intention of the parties is to be effectuated; and for that
purpose, it is not unusual to construe or as and."2 0
A variation of the above form of limitation would be "to A, his
heirs and assigns," with no conjunctive or disjunctive. Since this
is the form of limitation used in the State's statutory21 deed, there
can be no question as to its sufficiency.
Location of the Words of Inheritance
The statutory22 form of deed prescribed for South Carolina pro-
vides for the use of words of inheritance in the habendum only,
but the law is settled that such words are effective if they appear
in either the granting28 or habendum24 clause.
Suppose, however, that there are no words of inheritance in either
the granting clause or habendum, but the warranty is in favor of
the grantee and his heirs against the grantor and his heirs. Can the
warranty clause be used to enlarge the estate granted? The ques-
tion has been presented repeatedly to the Court of South Carolina,2 5
19. White v. Crawford, 10 Mass. 183, 188 (1813).
20. The American Law Institute takes the position that a limitation to one
"or his heirs" is sufficient to convey the fee simple if the limitation is of a
present estate. If, however, it is of a future estate, it is a matter of construc-
tion whether "heirs" was used as a word of limitation or as indicative of an
intention to make an alternative gift to the grantee's heirs as purchasers, in
which latter event the required words of limitation with respect to the grantee
being absent, he takes but an estate for life. In the absence of evidence of a
contrary intent, heirs is a word of limitation, and the grantee takes a fee simple.
RtsTATEm NT, PRoPERTY § 27, comments d and e.
21. S. C. Coug oF LAws § 57-251 (1952) : ". . . to have and to hold...
unto said C D, his heirs and assigns, forever."
22. S. C. CODE OF LAws § 57-251 (1952).
23. Shealy v. Shealy, 120 S. C. 276, 113 S. E. 131 (1922).
24. McLeod v. Tarrant, 39 S. C. 271, 17 S. E. 773 (1893) ; Chavis v. Chavis,
57 S. C. 173, 35 S. E. 507 (1900). See Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210
S. C. 47, 52, 41 S. E. 2d 393 (1947).
25. Jordan v. Neese, 36 S. C. 295, 15 S. E. 202, 31 Am. St. Rep. 869 (1892);
Wilson v. Watkins, 48 S. C. 341, 26 S. X. 663 (1897); McMichael v. Mc-
Michael, 51 S. C. 555, 29 S. E. 403 (1898); Wilson v. Garland, 77 S. C. 171,
57 S. E. 728 (1907); Windham v. Howell, 78 S. C. 187, 59 S. E. 852 (1907);
Austin v. Hunter, 85 S. C. 472, 67 S. R. 734 (1910) ; Sullivan v. Moore, 92
S. C. 305, 75 S. E. 497 (1912) ; Fore v. Marion Lumber Co., 114 S. C. 501,
104 S. R. 179 (1920); Elliott v. Bristow, 186 S. C. 544, 196 S. E. 378 (1938).
See Note, 47 A. L. R. 870 (1927).
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and the answer, in accord with the common law view,2 6 is that it
cannot. Confronted with the ingenious argument that even though
the warranty clause cannot enlarge the estate granted, yet it should
be construed as creating an estoppel against the grantor and his heirs
to deny that the parties intended the passage of the fee, the Court
thus disposed of the heresy: "We cannot accept this view, for if
it should be adopted, it would fritter away and practically destroy
the well settled and conceded rule that the warranty clause cannot
operate so as to enlarge the estate granted. Indeed, in most cases
where deeds drawn by unskillful draughtsmen, fail to carry the
fee by reason of the omission of the requisite words of inheri-
tance, the real intention of the parties is defeated, and we do not
think the use of the word 'heirs' in the warranty clause can be used
to establish such intention, especially where found in a deed so in-
artificially drawn as this is."
2 7
However, while the inclusion of words of inheritance in the war-
ranty will not ipso facto supply their omission in the granting clause
or the habendum, nor raise an estoppel against the grantor or his
heirs to deny the conveyance of the fee, yet the warranty may be
used as evidence of the intention of the parties in a suit for reforma-
tion of the deed on the ground of mistake. Thus, where the evidence
was undisputed that the grantee had paid full value for a conveyance
in fee, the Court, in affirming a decree of reformation of the deed
to supply omitted words of inheritance, commented as follows on the
evidentiary value of a warranty to the grantee and his heirs: "The
warranty clause could not, of course, have the effect of enlarging
the estate granted, but the fact that the grantor expressed the in-
tention to warrant the title to the grantee and his heirs, is itself a
circumstance indicating that the omission of the words 'heirs' from
other portions of the deed was due to inadvertence or mistake."
2 8
Incorporation by Reference of Words of Inheritance
Suppose there are no words of inheritance in either the granting
clause or the habendum, but the deed provides that the land con-
26. Co. LiTr. 385b: "But a twarrantie of it selfe cannot enlarge an estate;
as if the lessor by deed release to his lessee for life, and warrant the land to
the lessee and his heirs, yet doth not this enlarge his estate."
The Restatement takes the position that words of inheritance in the war-
ranty are sufficient to supply their omission in other parts of the deed. Rx-
STATEM-fNT, PROPERTY § 27, comment h, illustration 13.
27. Chief Justice Mclver in Jordan v. Neese, 36 S. C. 295, 301, 15 S. E. 202,
31 Am. St. Rep. 869 (1892).
28. Austin v. Hunter, 85 S. C. 472, 475, 67 S. E. 734 (1910). See also Sulli-
van v. Moore, 92 S. C. 305, 75 S. E. 497 (1912); Byrd v. O'Neal, 106 S. C.
346, 91 S. E. 293 (1917); Mathis v. Hair, 112 S. C. 320, 99 S. E. 810 (1919).
8
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.veyed is to be held "upon the terms stated in the deed from A to B."
There is authority,2 9 both ancient and modern, that such incor-
poration by reference of the terms of another writing can be made,
and if the latter instrument contains words of inheritance,30 the
deed will convey an estate in fee simple. Thus, where -a deed pur-
ported to convey all the grantor's right, title and interest in the
property, but lacked words of inheritance, it was held that a deri-
vation clause reciting the source of the grantor's title by volume
and page of the record was a sufficient incorporation of the words
of inheritance in the deed. to the grantor so that the fee simple
estate passed under the subsequent deed lacking such words.3 1
No South Carolina case making mention of the principle of incor-
poration of words of inheritance by reference has been found. How-
ever, in a proper case the Court may well elect to recognize a rule
which can muster in its favor so much authority and reason.
Heirs as Purchasers
Suppose that in a deed the limitation is "to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of B." If B is dead at the time of the conveyance, those
persons who constitute his heirs under the Statute of Descent and
Distribution take a vested remainder as purchasers by virtue of the
29. Co. Lmr'. 9b; SHZP. ToucH. 101; 2 PRzsTox, EsTATEs 2; LtAX, PRO-
imTY 156; 4 KENT 5; RFsTATEimZT, PROPERTY § 28 (see Tentative Draft
No. 1, Explanatory Note to § 32) ; 1 TI'rAIxy, REAL PRoPaRY § 28 (3rd ed.) ;
Lytle v. Lytle, 10 Watts 259 (Pa. 1840); Gould v. Lamb, 11 Met. 84, 45 Am.
Dec. 187 (Mass. 1846); Wickersham v. Bills, 8 Ind. 387 (1856); Mercier v.
Ry., 54 Mo. 506 (1874); Lemon v. Graham, 131 Pa. 447, 19 A. 48 (1890);
Brady v. Evans, 79 Md. 142, 28 A. 1061 (1894).
30. In Lytle v. Lytle, 10 Watts 259 (Pa. 1840), where the incorporation by
reference was of a will lacking words of inheritance, it was held that this
did not supply the omission in the deed, even though the limitation referred
to was sufficient to pass the fee by way of devise. R-sTATEaMET, PROpERTY,
Tentative Draft No. 1, Explanatory Note to § 32, states: "The Advisers
divided about evenly on the correctness of the decision." As a result, the
following appears in RrsTATsmmiT, PRoPRTY § 28:
"Caveat: The Institute takes no position as to whether an estate in fee
simple absolute is created by an otherwise effective conveyance inter vivos
of land which indicates the estate created thereby by reference to the effect
of another instrument by which an estate in fee simple absolute is created
where the instrument to which reference is made does not itself contain
words of inheritance."
31. Brady v. Evans, 79 Md. 142, 28 A. 1061 (1894). This case is Illustra-
tion 2 in § 32, REsTATEMtNT, PRoPZRTY (Tentative Draft No. 1). It does
not appear in Section 28 of the final Restatement, but the Explanatory Note
to the Tentative Draft shows that Brady v. Evans "is agreed by all the Ad-
visers to be correctly decided." The decision may be subject to criticism on
the ground that it does not come within the scope of the exception as outlined
in the authorities, it being doubtful whether there is sufficient expression of
an intent to incorporate the words of inheritance in the prior deed.
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limitation to them.32 If, however, B is living at the time of the con-
veyance, the remainder to his heirs is necessarily contingent, since
thosev.persons who will answer the description cannot be determined
until the death of B.33 If B dies during the lifetime of A, the re-
mainder will then vest in those persons who are his heirs.34 If A
dies during the lifetime of B, the contingent remainder to the heirs
of B fails at common law for want of a precedent life estate to sup-
port it.
35
Assuming, however, that the remainder to the heirs of B vests by
reason of B predeceasing A, is the remainder in his heirs for life
or in fee? In other words, where "heirs" is used as a word of
purchase must there be a limitation to the heirs "and their heirs"
to create an estate in fee simple in the heirs taking as purchasers?
The common law rule is settled that where the word "heirs" has
legal effect as a word of purchase, it operates also as a word of
limitation describing the nature of the estate taken by the "heirs,"
who therefore take an estate in fee simple.38
Two common law doctrines must be borne in mind in connection
with this principle. If the limitation is to the heirs of the grantor,
the application of the common law dogma, 'nemo est haeres Viventis,
will make such a limitation ineffectual to create a remainder in the
32. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 321 (3rd ed.). See 1 SrmEs, FUTURS
INTERESTS § 83.
33. 1 SInES, FUTURE INTEDusTS § 83; 2 TIFFANY., RxAr PROPERTY § 321
(3rd ed.). See, as to the distinction between vested and contingent remainders,
Faber v. Police, 10 S. C. 376 (1878); Walker v. Alverson, 87 S. C. 55, 68
S. E. 966 (1910).
34. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 321 (3rd ed.).
35. 1 SI ES, FUTUaz INTERESTS § 99; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 327
(3rd ed.). For an example of the destruction of a contingent remainder by a
premature termination of the supporting life estate (life estate to illegitimate
daughter of testator avoided by testator's lawful son), see Bouknight v. Brown,
16 S. C. 155 (1881). Section 57-4, S. C. CODZ OF LAWS (1952), enacted in
1883, only purports to preserve a contingent remainder from destruction by a
tortious feoffment by a life tenant, and apparently has no other efficacy in
altering the common law. See McCreary v. Coggeshall, 74 S. C. 42, 53 S. E.
978 (1906). But see the dicta of Mr. Justice Cothran in his concurring opinion
in Spann v. Carson, 123 S. C. 371, 386, 116 S. E. 7 (1923).
36. "Also in a limitation to the heirs, or the right heirs of a person: in
those instances in which the heirs are to take by purchase, the word heirs,
at the sanie time that it operates as a word of purchase, has the effect of a
word of limitation; describing, itno flatu, the persons who are to take, and the
quantity of the interest or time they are to have." 2 PRESTON, ESTATES 28.
See also 4 CRUISE, DIGEST 438, tit. 32, c. 23, § 69 (1st Amer. ed. 1808) ; Co.
Lrrr. 10a; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 30. The rule is inapplicable when the
limitation is to grantor's "next of kin." Boyce v. Mosely, 102 S. C. 361, 86
S. E. 771 (1915).
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heirs, the grantor by operation of law retaining the reversion in
himself.
7
Also, if the remainder to the heirs of B is preceded by a life estate
given in the same instrument to the ancestor, in circumstances where
the Rule in Shelley's Case is applicable, the remainder to the heirs
becomes a remainder to the ancestor in fee simple.38
By statute,89 the Rule in Shelley's Case has been abolished in South
Carolina as to all instruments executed since September 30, 1924,
and therefore a deed executed since that date "to A for life, remainder
to his heirs" by the express ternqs of the statute will create a life
estate in A, and a remainder 40 in fee simple in his heirs.
In construing the word "heirs" in a limitation, however, a con-
structional tendency of the courts in certain contexts to consider
the word "heirs" as used in a non-technical sense as synonomous
with "children" must be noted.4 ' While "heirs" normally is given
its technical meaning as indicative of an indefinite line of descent,
in a justifiable desire to avoid the application of the Rule in Shelley's
Case, the courts have frequently seized upon the circumstance of
other qualifying language in a deed or will, to avoid the technical
meaning of the word. If "heirs" is construed as the equivalent of
"children," the common law principle that "heirs" when used as a
word of purchase is also a word of limitation has no application.42
In connection with this principle that where there is a legally
37. 1 Sutrs, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 144. While at an earlier day this was
a rule of law operating irrespective of the intention of the grantor, recent
cases have treated it as a rule of construction. Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y.
305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919), and cases discussed in SImES, FUTURE INTERE Ts
§ 147; see Note, 125 A. L. R_ 543 (1940), s. 16 A. L. R. 2d 693 (1951). A
dictum in Wilson v. Poston, 129 S. C. 345, 356, 123 S. E. 849 (1924), treats
the dogma as a rule of law.
38. Jarecky v. Jarecky, 194 S. C. 456, 9 S. E. 2d 922 (1940).
39. "The rule of law known as the rule in Shelley's Case is hereby abolished
in the following particulars, to-wit: when, by deed or will or by any instrument
in writing, a remainder in lands, tenements, hereditaments or other real estate
shall be limited to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of a person to whom a life
estate in the same premises is given, the persons who, on the termination of the
life estate, are the heirs or heirs of the body of such tenant for life shall take
as purchasers in fee simple, by virtue of the remainder so limited to them.
The provisions of this section shall not affect wills, deeds and other instru-
ments in writing executed prior to October 1, 1924 or the- construction of such
wills, deeds and other instruments in writing." S. C. CoDE or LAWS § 57-2 (1952).
40. Which remainder is probably contingent, rather than vested subject to
being divested. 1 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §H 83-92; SrIMEs, HAN-DBoo op
THE LAW OV FUTURE INTERESTS 34 (1951); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 249,
comment e.
41. Duckett v. Butler, 67 S. C. 130, 45 S. E. 137 (1903). 1 SImEs, FURE
INTERESTs § 122.
42. See Dickert v. Dickert, 12 Rich. 396 (S. C. 1859). RESTATEMNT, PRO-
PERTY § 30, comment a.
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effective remainder to the heirs of a designated person, they take
in fee simple rather than for life, one South Carolina case is worthy
of comment. In the leading case, Wilson v. Poston,43 a deed by hus-
band and wife to a daughter provided that if the daughter should
die without children (so the limitation was construed), the property
should "return to our estate and be equally divided among our heirs."
The Court, per Mr. Justice Cothran, held that the executory limita-
tion after an estate in fee simple was valid, and that the heirs took
as purchasers under the limitation, nenzo est haeres ziventis being
inapplicable because the language "to be equally divided among our
heirs" altered the shares the heirs would have taken by operation
of law. It was further held that the heirs took but estates for life
as purchasers, since, in the language of the Court, "there being no
words of inheritance attached to 'our heirs', it follows that the heirs
would take a life estate per capita, and the descended fee, not dis-
posed of, per stirpes."
Assuming, as the Court did, that the quoted language meant more
than that a moiety of the property was to go to the heirs of each of
the grantors, the holding that neno est haeres viventis is inapplicable
seems correct, since the limitation is not to the heirs as they would
have taken by descent. 44 The further ruling that the heirs took only
a life estate is more debatable, but in theory can probably be justi-
fied.45 The point of the present discussion is that the case can
readily be distinguished from the normal situation calling for the ap-
plication of the common law rule that where "heirs" take'as pur-
chasers they take an estate in fee simple unless expressly limited
to a lesser estate.
43. 129 S. C. 345, 123 S. E. 849 (1924).
44. RESTATLEXNT, PROPIRTY § 314, comment c. This would appear to be
by analogy to the testamentary transfer, or "worthier title" doctrine. See 1
Sn s, FUTURE INTERESTS § 144; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 1118 n. 20
(3rd ed.).
45. Under the rule as stated in Section 30 of the Restatement of Property,
it would seem that the heirs take in fee simple, even though they do not take
in the same proportions as they would have taken by descent. But if an analogy
is drawn to the worthier title doctrine, note 44, supra, the decision of the South
Carolina Court is correct. However, if an analogy is drawn to certain South
Carolina cases involving the Rule in Shelley's Case, the decision would appear
erroneous. See Davis v. Dalrymple, 163 S. C. 490, 161 S. E. 738 (1931), and
the cases therein cited, to the effect that the Rule is applicable despite the
fact that the remainder to the heirs is in equal shares. See also, Green v.
Green, 210 S. C. 391, 395, 396, 42 S. E. 2d 884 (1947). 2 TIFFANY, RAL
PROPERTY § 350 (3rd ed.). But see RESTAT:"mtNT, PROPERTY § 312, comment g.
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CHAPTER II.
EXCEPTIONS TO THiE RULE
Devises
The word "heirs" has never been necessary to effect a devise of
land in fee simple; all that was necessary at common law was that
the language employed dearly indicate that an estate in fee simple
rather than a life estate was to be created.46 The discord between
the decisions of the courts of equity and of law in South Carolina in the
first quarter of the nineteenth century47 was not occasioned by any
disagreement as to this general principle, but by a difference as to
what language constituted sufficient evidence that an estate in fee
simple was intended. The whole matter was settled by the Act of
1824,48 which established a constructional preference in favor of the
creation of an estate in fee simple in the absence of an intention to
the contrary expressed or implied in the will.
Deeds to Corporations
"To the X Corporation and assigns." Should the title be passed?
Obviously the word "heirs" is unnecessary and ineffectual in a con-
veyance to a corporation. But is the word "successors" essential
to the passage of the fee? No South Carolina decision has been
found, but there is no reason to doubt that the Court would follow
the well settled rule49 that neither "heirs" nor "successors" is neces-
sary in a deed to a corporation aggregate. This is on the theory that
a corporation never dies, and a grant of an estate for its life is a
grant forever, and therefore in fee simple. But what of a corpora-
tion sole? Again the question has not been presented in South Caro-
46. Co. LITT. 9b; 2 BLACKSTONE 108; 4 KENT 7; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 31 (3rd ed.) ; 2 POWLL, REAL PROPERTY § 183; RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 37.
47. See note 6, supra.
48. S. C. CODE OF LAWS § 19-232 (1952) quoted in note 6, supra.
49. Co. LITT. 9b; 2 BLACKSTONM 109; 4 KENT 7; 1 TIFFANY § 29 (3rd ed.);
7 THompsoN, IZ A1 PROPERTY § 3556; RESTATEMZNT, I FOPEl § 34. A cor-
poration may acquire a fee simple title to land, even. thougj4 te period of its
existence be limited to a number of years. 6A FLRTcHR, CoRPoRATIoNs § 2817
(1950). In St Clair County Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63, 24 L. Ed.
651, 652 (1878) the United States Supreme Court stated that "a grant to a
corporation aggregate, limited as to the duration of its existence, without
words of perpetuity being annexed to the grant, would only create an estate
for the life of the corporation." Contra: Asheville Division No. 15, Sons of
Temperance v. Aston, 92 N. C. 578 (1878). RESTATE-zENT, PROPERTY § 34
commtnt b. Business corporations organized pursuant to the present general
statute law of South Carolina have perpetual duration "unless limited by the
terms of the petition." S. C. CODE OF LA-ws § 12-63 (1952). See however,
Code § 12-401, and § 2, Art. 9, S. C. Constitution (1895), reserving to the
State the power to amend or repeal the charters of domestic corporations.
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lina, but it is clear that at common law a fee simple estate cannot be
created in a corporation sole by deed without the use of the word
"successors." 50
Deeds to a Government
Words of inheritance or succession are unnecessary in the convey-
ance by deed of a fee simple estate to the United States, or to a
State or subdivision thereof.5 1
Releases Between Joint Tenants
5 2
It is well settled at common law that one joint tenant can release
his interest to the other Without the use of words of inheritance.
5 3
"The reason for this," says the Restatement,5 4 "is that each joint
tenant was historically regarded as having an estate in fee simple
absolute in all the land in which the joint tenancy exists and conse-
quently the conveyance does not enlarge the- estate of the conveyee."
The same rule is not applicable to a conveyance by one tenant in
common to another, since in theory of law tenants in common have
separate and distinct estates in the land, even though physically un-
divided.55
Mention is made of this exception since it is conceivable that in
some future case an astute title advocate by a bit of legal legerdemain
may sustain a deed otherwise defective because of omission of words
of inheritance. The South Carolina statute5 6 provides:
"When any person shall be, at the time of his death, seized
or possessed of any estate in joint tenancy the same shall be
50. Co. Lir. 8b, 94b; 2 BLACKSTONE 109; 1 TInFANY § 29 (3rd ed.); 7
TuoMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 3555; RESTATEMfENT, PROPERTY § 33.
51. Sylvester v. State, 46 Wash. 585, 91 P. 15 (1907), aff'd 215 U. S. 80,
30 S. Ct. 25, 54 L. Ed. 101 (1909) ; Dyer v. Siano, 298 Mass. 537, 11 N. E.
2d 451 (1937). RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 35.
52. The term "release" as here used must be distinguished from a partition
by deed, the former being a conveyance by one tenant of all his interest in
the land to another tenant, while a partition by deed involves a physical di-
vision of the land. As to the validity of a voluntary partition in South Caro-
lina, even when parol, see Goodhue v. Barnwell, Rice Eq. 198 (S. C. 1839) ;
Kennemore v. Kennemore, 26 S. C. 251, 1 S. E. 881 (1887) ; Rountree v. Lane,
32 S. C. 160, 10 S. E. 941 (1890); Mims v. Hair, 80 S. C. 460, 61 S. E. 968
(1908) ; Dantzler v. Riley, 109 S. C. 44, 95 S. E. 132 (1918).
53. "First, where an estate of inheritance passeth and continueth; as if there
be three coparceners or joyntenants, and one of them release to the other
two, or .to one of them generally without this word (heirs), by Littleton's
own opinion they have a fee simple, as appeareth hereafter." Co. Lir. 9b.
See also 4 KENT 7; RESTATEMtENT, PROPERTY § 29.
54. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 29, comment e.
55. 2 POWELL, REA.L PROPERTY § 181 n. 44. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 29,
comment f.
56. S. C: CODE OF LAWS § 19-55 (1952).
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adjudged to be severed by the death of the joint tenant and shall
be distributable as if the same were a tenancy in common."
Several South Carolina cases57 have indicated, in accordance with
the language of the statute, that joint tenancies have not been wholly
abolished, but only the feature of survivorship. If this be true, it
would appear that an estate in joint tenancy retains all of its com-
mon law characteristics until the death of one of the joint tenants,
and that a release without words of inheritance made by a tenant
during his lifetime would operate as it did at common law, since the
severance by the statute does not occur unless the tenant dies "seised
or possessed" of the property.
Even assuming that such reasoning would be sustained by the
Court, however, its application is necessarily limited, being depen-
dent upon the circumstance of a release by one tenant to the other
without words of inheritance, and upon a finding by the Court that
a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common existed.
Mortgages
It has been held5 8 that since the Act of 179!.59 which transformed
the mortgage of land in South Carolina from a conveyance on con-
dition into a legal lien, words of inheritance are no longer necessary,
and that a foreclosure of a mortgage lacking such words will transfer
the fee simple estate of the mortgagor.
Conveyances by An Officer
In South Carolina it has been held60 that a conveyance of the in-
terest in land of a party by an officer pursuant to statutory authority
or a court order, passes the entire estate of the party, even though
words of inheritance are inadvertently omitted from the conveyance.
57. "The cases indicate that joint tenancies are not abolished as such, only
the feature of survivorship. Herbemont v. Thomas, Cheves' Equity 21 (S. C.
1839) ; Ball v. Deas, 2 Strobhart's Equity 24 (S. C. 1848) ; Telfair v. Howe,
3 Richardson's Equity 235, 55 Am. Dec. 637 (S. C. 1851). The first two of
these cases hold that the statute applies only to vested interests: and where in
a will there is simply a gift to A and B, without such intent-manifesting
words as 'in equal shares' or like terms indicating division into equal or other
specified portions, and one of the donees dies before the testator, the survivor
takes the entire estate. To the same effect is Free v. Sandifer, 131 S. C. 232,
126 S. E. 521 (1924)." Karesh, Devolution of Interests in Triest Estates, 1
S. C. L. Q. 367, 380 note 37 (1949).
58. Bredenburg v. Landrum, 32 S. C. 215, 10 S. E. 956 (1890).
59. S. C. CoDE o ,, LAws § 45-51 (1952).
60. Carolina Savings Bank v. McMahon, 37 S. C. 309, 16 S. E. 31 (1892)
(sheriff's deed pursuant to sale under judgment execution) ; Sumter Fertilizer
Company v. Baker, 206 S. C. 446, 34 S. E. 2d 681 (1945) (master's deed in
mortgage foreclosure).
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Conveyance to Partner7ship in Firm Name
Since the enactment in South Carolina of the Uniform Partnership
Act, 6 ' words of inheritance are no longer necessary in a conveyance
to the partnership in its firm name.62 However, the Act does not
purport to alter the rule where the conveyance is to the partners, and
presumably the general rule requiring words of inheritance in deeds
of land in South Carolina is still applicable.63
CHAPThR III.
TRUST DEEDS
A well recognized exception to the requirement of words of in-
heritance for the conveyance of a fee simple estate by deed is that
made in favor of trust deeds. -The exception, of course, is not peculiar
to South Carolina law, having been recognized to a greater or lesser
extent in England and other American jurisdictions during the days
when they also required the magic words in inter vivos conveyances.
64
61. S. C. Acts 1950, No. 742; 46 Stat. 1841; S. C. CODE OF LAws §§ 52-1 to
52-79 (1952).
62. S. C. CODE OF LAws § 52-13(4) (1952), (Uniform Partnership Act, § 8,
subsec. (4)) : "A conveyance to a partnership in the jartnership name, though
without words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor unless a
contrary intent appears." See 1 AiEmicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.5, p. 92.
63. Karesh, Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South
Carolina, 3 S. C. L. Q. 193, 251 (1951).
64. The English rule as to deeds of trust executed prior to the legislative
abolishment of the requirement of words of inheritance (note 1, supra) would
seem to be that unless such words are annexed to the name of the trustee, no
interest greater than a life estate passes by the deed, even though the pur-
poses of the trust necessitate that the trustee take the fee. Doe ex dem
Pottow v. Fricker, 6 Exch. 510, 155 Eng. Rep. 645 (1851) ; In re Irwin, [1904]
2 Ch. 752. Scot, TRUSTS § 88 n. 3. If the deed conveys to the trustee and
his heirs, but omits words of inheritance after the name of the beneficiary,
the beneficiary takes but an estate for life, even though the intention that
he take in fee is apparent, if the trust is an executed one. In re Bostoe's
Settlement, [1921] 2 Ch. 469. However, a court of equity may reform the
deed by supplying words of inheritance after the beneficiary's name, if it ap-
pears that a conveyance in fee was intended. Banks v. Ripley, [1940] Ch. 719.
See ScoTT, TRUSTS § 128.1 (Supp. 1952). If the trust is executory, words of
inheritance after the. name of the beneficiary are not essential. In re Oliver's
Settlement, [1905] 1 Ch. 191. See In re Bostock's Settlement, [1921] 2 Ch. 469,
486; Lvn¢, TRUSTS 64 (14th ed. 1939). As used in the English cases the
term "executory trust" does not include all trusts not executed by the Statute
of Uses. See LEwIN, TRUSTS 66 (14th ed. 1939).
While certain of the American Courts followed the English rule as to the
necessity of words of inheritance in trust deeds, others have held that the
trustee takes an estate in fee simple despite the omission of technical words of
limitation, if such an estate is necessary for the performance of the trust, and
that an equitable estate in fee simple can be given the beneficiary, even though
words of inheritance are not annexed to his name. ScoTt, TRUSTS §§ 88, 128.1;
Note, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172 (1906). See, in accord with the view of the
more liberal American courts, IA BoCRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 144,
182 (1951); ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 88, 128.1; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 32; R-
STATAiENT, TRUSTS §§ 88, comment d, 128 comment a.
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Origin and Historical Background
The exemption of the trust deed from the technicality of common
law conveyancing is founded upon historical reasons. Prior to the
Statute of Uses65 the law courts had long since formulated the dogma
that an estate of inheritance would not pass by deed unless the word
"heirs" was annexed to the name of the grantee. The courts of
chancery were bound by no such ritualism, and if a bargain and sale
of the use of land in fee had been intended by the parties, the chan-
cellor would enforce such use, even though words of inheritance had
been omitted from the conveyance. After the' Statute converted
certain passive uses into legal interests, these erstwhile "uses" be-
came legal estates, and were assimilated to the rule governing con-
veyances at law. Thus, if before the Statute A bargained and sold
the use of land "to B in fee," under the limitation B took an equitable
fee simple. After the Statute converted the interest of B under such
a conveyance into a legal estate, however, the court of chancery had
no jurisdiction in enforcing the legal interest created in B, and fol-
lowed the law in holding that B took only a life interest in the ab-
sence of words of inheritance.
66
It is familiar law that when it is necessary for the purposes of a
trust of land that legal title be in the trustee, the use will not be
executed by the Statute of Uses. 67 As before the Statute, this un-
65. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535); S. C. CoD4 oF LAWS §§ 67-8, 67-9, 67-10
(1952).
66. "It is settled, that the same words, which are necessary to create an estate
in fee upon a couveyance at common law, are equally necessary upon a con-
veyance to uses since the statute. It is true, that if before the statute, a man
had bargained and sold his lands for a valuable consideration, without having
limited the use to the heirs of the bargainee, Chancery, which considered the
intention of the parties, would have decreed an estate in fee. But as the
statute now executes the use, and the bargainee has a legal estate, the same
construction must be had upon his legal estate by the statute, as upon estates
by the common law; and, therefore, in the case put, the bargainee, since the
statute, can only have an estate for life." 1 SANDERS, USES AND TRUSTS 122
(2d Amer. ed.). See also 4 KENT 6, quoted in note 100, infra.
While conceding that this is the rule followed by the courts, Preston had
difficulty in justifyiLg the law court's arrogation of the construction of legal
interests created under the Statute.
"It has been said, that as the statute now executes the use, and the bargainee
has a legal estate, the same construction must be made, as to this legal estate,
under the statute, as was made on gifts of estates at the common-law.
"For this conclusion no well-founded reason can be urged. The construction
of law on the bargain and sale ought to have been precisely the same, after
the statute, as the construction of the Court of Chancery would have been
when uses were fiduciary, and under the immediate and peculiar jurisdiction
of that Court. That construction seems to have been expressly directed by the
very letter of the Statute of Uses." 2 PR.STOX, ESTATES 66.
67. Among the many South Carolina cases to this effect, see Posey v. Cook,
1 Hill 413 (S. C. 1833); Spann v. Carson, 123 S. C. 371, 384, 116 S. E. 7
(1923) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Cothran). ScoTt, TausTs §§ 69,
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executed use is peculiarly within the jurisdiction of a court of equity,
and that court will enforce it according to the intention of the par-
ties, unfettered by the common law rule that words of inheritance
are essential to pass the fee at law.
68
This in brief is the theory of the exemption of the trust deed from
the common law requirement of words of inheritance. The difficulty
lies in determining what is a trust deed and how far the exception
in its favor is to be extended. With the abolition of the require-
ment of words of inheritance in England and practically all Ameri-
can jurisdictions, 69 learning on the subject has become obsolete for
the practitioner. Thus, modern American texts on trusts make but
passing mention of the matter instead of including whole sections as
in the older works. This in part may account for the continued
popularity in South Carolina of Perry on Trusts and Trustees (first
edition 1872), which, together with Washburn on Real Property, and
Kent's Commentaries, has been the standard authority of the Court,
in questions involving the requirement or non-requirement of words
of inheritance in trust deeds.
It is well that the subject has become obsolete, since at best it was
a dubious melange of conflicting opinions and interpretations of the
earlier text writers. An unreasonable fiat of obscure origin must in-
evitably produce contradictions and multiply distinctions without dif-
ference. As late as 1921 the Court of Appeal, Chancery Division,
7 0
found it necessary to overrule an earlier decision which, after con-
siderable wavering in the English cases, had been thought to settle
the law in favor of a liberal construction of the exemption. For
present purposes a general review of the tenuous distinctions which
have been made is not profitable, and the balance of this section will
69.1. An additional situation in which a use in land will not be executed
by the Statute is in the case of a use on a use. Danner v. Trescott, 5 Rich.
Eq. 356, 363 (S. C. 1853). See Ramsay v. Marsh, 2 McCord 252, 254 (S. C.
1822); Wilson v. Chesire, 1 McCord Eq. 233, 239 (S. C. 1826); Blount v.
Walker, 31 S. C. 13, 26 (1889). ScoTT, TRUSTS § 71. Also, the Statute will
not be operative in the case of a trust of a term of years, which is treated
as personal property. See Ramsay v. Marsh, 2 McCord 252, 255 (S. C. 1822);
Wilson v. Chesire, 1 McCord Eq. 233, 239 (S. C. 1826). Scorr, TRUSTS § 70.
68. This seems to be the rationale of the American Courts which have
exempted trust deeds from the common law requirement of words of inheri-
tance. See Fisher v. Fields, 10 Johns. 494, 506 (N. Y. 1813) (opinion by
Chancellor Kent) ; Bratton v. Massey, 15 S. C. 277, 285 (1881) ; McMichael v.
McMichael, 51 S. C. 555, 558, 29 S. E. 403 (1898); Duncan v. Clarke, 106
S. C. 17, 19, 90 S. E. 180 (1916). See note 64, .rpra, as to the view of the
English and some American Courts that an executed trust must be construed
in accord with the rules governing legal limitations.
69. See notes 1, 2, supra.
70. Inr re Bostock's Settlement, [1921] 2 Ch. 469, over-ruling In re Tringham's
Trusts, [.1904] 2 Ch. 487. Both cases review the English cases and texts, but
differ as to the conclusion to be drawn therefrom.
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be devoted to a discussion of what instruments the South Carolina
Court has construed to be deeds of trust, and what have been declared
to be mere common law deeds which require the word "heirs" to
pass the fee.
For the purposes of analysis the cases can best be studied by simpli-
fying them into A and B situations, and this treatment has been
adopted in the subsequent classification and discussion. It is ele-
mentary that in considering the sufficiency of any attempted transfer
of property, either legal or equitable, real or personal, two questions
are presented. The first is whether or not an intention to make a
transfer of the interest has been manifested. Assuming an affirma-
tive answer, the problem remaining is whether or not the intention
has been expressed in a manner to which the law will give legal effect.
If this second question must be answered in the negative, the at-
tempted transfer necessarily fails, no matter how clearly the intention
to make the transfer has been expressed. Thus, an attempted devise
"to my son John in fee simple" perfectly expresses the decedent's
intention, but if the instrunent has not been executed in compliance
with the requirements of the Statute of Wills the expressed inten-
tion is a nullity. Likewise, a deed of land from A "to B in fee
simple" fails of its purpose in South Carolina, not because of an
imperfect manifestation of intention, but because of a rule of law
which says that a fee simple estate cannot pass by such an instrument
unless certain formal language has been used.
In all the simplified situations herein discussed, we are concerned
only with their legal sufficiency and not with the query whether or
not an intention to transfer an estate in fee simple is present. The
finding of such an intention is a problem of construction to be solved
by a consideration of the language used, the relationship between the
parties, whether or not a consideration was paid for the transfer, etc.
71
71. In Bratton v. Massey, 15 S. C. 277 (1881), the instrument involved,
which had been executed prior to the removal of married women's property
disabilities by the Constitution of 1868, was an inter vivos settlement of land
in trust for the support of the estranged wife of the grantor. It was held that
a power to consume during lifetime, coupled with a general testamentary power
of appointment, in conjunction with other circumstances, evidenced an inten-
tion to give the beneficiary an interest in fee simple. Ordinarily a general
power of appointment coupled with a life estate in the donee of the power
does not enlarge the estate into a fee simple one. See, among many other
cases, Blakely v. Blakely, 155 S. C. 123, 152 S. E. 24 (1930); Lynch v.
Lynch, 161 S. C. 170, 159 S. E. 26 (1931) ; Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S. C. 360, 70
S. E. 2d 637 (1952).
The use of the word "absolutely" in such phrases as "to vest absolutely" in
the beneficiary was held indicative of an intention to give the fee in Fuller v.
Missroon, 35 S. C. 314, 14 S. E. 714 (1892); Hunt v. Nolen, 46 S. C. 356, 24
S. E. 310, rehearing denied, 46 S. C. 551, 24 S. E. 543 (1896).
The recital of payment of a nominal monetary consideration was held to
19
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In the discussion which follows it is assumed that an intention to
make a transfer in fee simple has been found, and the only problem
is whether the law recognizes the manner in which the intention has
been expressed. Bearing these preliminary considerations in mind,
the South Carolina cases may be analysed as follows.72
Active Trusts
1. Deed from A to B and his heirs in trust to convey to C.
The limitation here considered is one where the use is not executed
by the Statute of Uses because of some purpose of the trust which
necessitates the retention of the legal title by the trustee.7 3 Words
of inheritance have been annexed to the name of the trustee, but
there are no technical words defining the estate of the beneficiary,
though an intention that he shall take an estate in fee simple is ap-
parent. Under these circumstances, does the beneficiary take an
interest in fee or only an interest for life, with a resulting trust7 4
of the remainder for the grantor or his heirs?
In South Carolina it is ciear that under such a limitation the bene-
ficiary takes an estate in fee simple.7 5 The rationale of the holding
is that the fee has been conveyed to the trustee, thus divesting the
grantor of the entire legal interest in the property. The manifest
rebut the presumption that a resulting trust for the grantor or his heirs was
intended in Fuller v. Missroon, supra; Foster v. Glover, 46 S. C. 522, 24 S. E.
370 (1896); Holder v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 91 S. E. 97 (1917); Hogg v.
Clemmons, 126 S. C. 469, 483, 120 S. E. 96 (1923) (concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Cothran). A fortiori, a substantial consideration was held to have the
same effect in Bratton v. Massey, 15 S. C. 277 (1881) ; Hunt v. Nolen, supra;
Welborn v. Holder, 143 S. C. 277, 141 S. E. 448 (1928).
72. Former students of Professor Coleman Karesh at the University of
South Carolina Law School will recognize the classification of the South Caro-
lina cases as that used by him in his course in Trusts. For this, as well as
for other valuable suggestions in the chapter on trust deeds, the writer is in-
debted to Professor Karesh.
73. In South Carolina a direction to convey to the beneficiary is an active
duty imposed upon the trustee which prevents the Statute from executing the
use in the beneficiary. Steele v. Smith, 84 S. C. 464, 66 S. E. 200 (1910). See
Linder v. Nicholson Bank and Trust Company, 170 S. C. 373, 379, 170 S. E. 429
(1933), and the cases therein cited. But where by the terms of the trust the
trustee is to reconvey to the settlor at the termination of the trust, it seems
that a re-conveyance by the trustee is not necessary to revest the settlor with
the legal title. See Linder v. Nicholson Bank and Trust Company, supra.
74. Instead of a resulting trust for the grantor, it may be argued that even
though the conveyance is to the trustee and his heirs, the trustee takes only a
life estate and the reversion is in the grantor, if an intention to convey only a
beneficial interest for life is manifested by the deed. See ScoTT, TRUSTS § 88;
RxESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 88. However, the South Carolina cases have spoken
in terms of a resulting trust for the grantor. See Bratton v. Massey, 15 S. C.
277 (1881) ; Foster v. Glover, 46 S. C. 522, 24 S. E. 370 (1896).
75. Bratton v. Massey, 15 S. C. 277 (1881); Fuller v. Missroon, 35 S. C.
314, 14 S. E. 714 (1892).
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intention is that the beneficiary is to take the equitable interest, thus
rebutting the presumption that any resulting trust for the grantor or
his heirs was intended.
2. Deed from A to B in trust to convey to C and his heirs.
This type of limitation has no words of inheritance defining the
estate of the trustee, but the equitable interest is to C and his heirs.
It is settled that the beneficiary takes an equitable estate in fee
simple despite the omission of words of inheritance after the trustee's
name.76 This is on the theory that.in its administration of trusts the
court of equity is not bound by the technicality of the common law,
and in equity the trustee will be deemed to have whatever estate is
necessary to fulfill the purposes of the trust.77 Here it is obvious that
the trustee must have a legal estate in fee simple to perform the
duties imposed upon him by the terms of the trust, and a court of
equity therefore will imply such an estate in him.
The same has been held true even though no words of inheritance
are used to define the quantum of the estate of the beneficiary if
the interition is manifested that he is to take an estate in fee simple.
Thus, a deed from A to B in trust to convey to C will necessitate the
finding of a legal fee simple estate in B to fulfill the purposes of the
trust.78
3. Deed from A to B in trust to pay the income to C for life, and
then to go to D.
This form of limitation is characterized by the fact that no words
of inheritance define the estate of the trustee, and further, though the
trust is active toward the life beneficiary, the use for the remainder-
man is a passive one executed by the Statute of Uses. Under such
circumstances is the remainder so executed in fee, or for life only,
if no words of inheritance are annexed to the name of the remainder-
man?
The question has confronted the Court, and the answer is that the
interest executed by the Statute is in fee, if such was intended by
76. Hunt v. Nolen, 46 S. C. 356, 24 S. E. 310, relearing denied 46 S. C. 551,
24 S. E. 543 (1896) ; Holder v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 91 S. E. 97 (1917).
77. See Middleton v. Taber, 46 S. C. 337, 351, 24 S. E. 282 (1896).
78. Hunt v. Nolen, 46 S. C. 356, 24 S. E. 310, rehearing denied 46 S. C. 551,
24 S. E. 543 (1896); Holder v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 91 S. E. 97 (1917);
Rembert v. Evans, 86 S. C. 445, 68 S. E. 659 (1910) (the report of the case
does not disclose whether words of inheritance were annexed to the name of the
trustee) ; Lee v. Miles, 56 S. C. 428, 35 S. E. 2 (1900). See Kennedy v.
Gramling, 33 S. C. 367, 379, 11 S. E. 1081 (1890).
21
Means: Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land in South Carolina: A Title
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
SOUTH CARoLINA LAW QUARTERLY
the grantor.79 The rationale seems to be that since the deed is in
part a trust deed, its construction is to be governed by the equity
rule even as to those interests created by the deed which are not in
trust but are purely legal interests.
Passive Trusts
4. Deed from A to B and his heirs in trust for C.
Despite the language "in trust" such a conveyance does not create
a trust enforceable in equity. From its inception, the conveyance is
merely one on a passive use which by operation of law is immediately
executed by the Statute of Uses to vest a legal estate in cestui que
use. The law is settled in South Carolina that the estate vested in
cestui que use is in fee simple if that was the intention of the grantor,
despite the fact that no words of inheritance are annexed to his name.8 0
The estate given the conduit to uses is one in fee simple, and the
Statute operates to vest the granted estate in cestui que use.81
5. Deed from A to B in trust for C and his heirs.
This presents the problem of a passive trust of land where the
conduit to uses has not been limited an estate in fee simple, but words
of inheritance have been annexed to the name of cestui que use. In
such a case,82 the Court has deviated from the doctrine of its mentor s,
and held that cestui que use takes a legal estate in fee simple in ac-
cordance with the intention of the grantor.
In theory the holding seems subject to question.8 4 The deed creates
79. Hunt v. Nolen, 46 S. C. 356, 24 S. E. 310, rehearing denied 46 S. C. 551,
24 S. E. 543 (1896); Holder v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 91 S. E. 97 (1917);
Hogg v. Clemmons, 126 S. C. 469, 120 S. E. 96 (1923). A fortiori, the re-
maindermen were held to take in fee simple where the conveyance was to the
trustee and his heirs. Brown v. McCall, 44 S. C. 503, 22 S. E. 823 (1895),
Buist v. Williams, 88 S. C. 252, 70 S. E. 817 (1911).
80. Foster v. Glover, 46 S. C. 522, 24 S. E. 370 (1896).
81. But cf. the statement of Warrington, L. 3., in In re Bostock's Settlement,
[1921] 2 Ch. 469, 484: "According to technical rules, a limitation to A.
and his heirs to the use of or in trust for B. confers on B. a legal estate for
life only."
82. Wqlbom v. Holder, 143 S. C. 277, 141 S. E. 448 (1928).
83. "But if A. gives an estate to B. for the use of C. and his heirs, the
statute will execute only an estate for the life of A. in C.; for that is the
extent of the estate conveyed to B. by a deed in that form; that is, by a deed
that has no words of inheritance in B." 1 Pzry, TRusT s AND TRuSTEfs
(7th ed.) § 312.
84. See cases cited in 1 PaRv, TRuSTS AND TRusTSs 547 n. 91 (7th ed.),
which by dicta or decision appear to support Mr. Perry's text statement. See
.Doe x dent Pottov v. Fricker, 6 Exch. 510, 155 Eng. Rep. 645 (1851). But
see Melick v. Pidcock, 44 N. J. R. 525, 15 A. 3 (1888), which is in accord
,with the South Carolina holding in Welborn v. Holder, note 82 supra. The
decision in the Melick case in part may be based upon an unusual phrasing
of the New Jersey Statute of Uses. Also in accord with the holding in the
Welborn case is RnsTA~rmatNT, TRuSTS § 88, illustration 8.
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no equitable interest, and as a matter of logic it appears that it should
be governed by the rules of the common law. The conveyance has
not been made to C and his heirs, but to B without words of inheri-
tance. The decision possibly may be justifiable only as a relaxation
of the common law dogma in favor of a more common sense rule.
6. Deed from A to B in trust for C.
This situation may not have been considered by the Court as yet,85
though at least one case8 sa has foreshadowed the question. The trust
85. Although the proposition is highly debatable, it would seem that the point
was not decided in McMillan v. Hughes, 88 S. C. 296, 70 S. E. 804 (1911).
The deed there involved was construed as a common law deed, apparently not
on the theory that a conveyance on a passive trust was made, but on the theory
that no trust, either active or passive was created. Writing the opinion for th.
court, Mr. Chief Justice Jones states (at p. 298) that the limitation involved
is "substantially similar" to that in Mcivfichael v. McMichael, 51 S. C. 555,
29 S. E. 403 (1898). A study of the limitation in the McMichael case shows
that in no manner could it be construed as creating any trust, either active
or passive. Yet the McMichael case is the primary authority relied on in
the McMillan case, being quoted at length. Undoubtedly a strong argument
could have been made in the McMillan case that a trust for the life of the
life tenant was created for her use and that of her children. See Hunter v.
Hunter, 58 S. C. 382, 36 S. E. 734 (1900); Folk v. Hughes, 100 S. C. 220,
84 S. E. 713 (1915); Black v. Harmon, 127 S. C. 359, 120 S. E. 705 (1923),
in which cases language very similar to that used in the McMillan case was
held to create trusts. The Hunter case was decided some eleven years prior
to the McMillan case, yet the opinion in the later case makes no mention of it.
This would seem to further evidence the conclusion that the proper justifica-
tion of the deed as a trust instrument was neither urged upon the court nor
considered by it.
On appeal, while the Circuit Judge's ruling that the deed was a trust deed
and, therefore, exempt from the requirement of words of inheritance to pass
the fee was declared erroneous, yet the decree was affirmed on the grounds
of an estoppel in pais against the grantor to deny the passage of the fee, due
to his subsequent representations regarding the title. This sustaining ground
seems to have been the chiefly contested point on appeal. The unsatisfactory
rationale of Mr. Chief Justice Jones' opinion seems indicated by the fact that
Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Gary concurred only in the result. It would
seem, therefore, that the McMillan case is not authority for the proposition
that a passive trust must be construed as a legal limitation in questions involv-
ing the effect of the omission of words of inheritance.
85a. In Hogg v. Clemmons, 126 S. C. 469, 120 S. E. 96 (1923), the deed
was to A, "trustee for his children" (without words of inheritance), A to
manage and control the property during his life and at his death to vest in
the children. As against the contention that the deed was not a trust deed but
created only a beneficial estate in A for his life, the Court held that the life
estate given A was an active trust for his children, and that the deed being
a trust deed, words of inheritance were unnecessary to carry the remainder
in fee to the children. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court, per Mr.
Justice Fraser, indicates that the fee would have been held to have passed
even though the trust was executed by the Statute of Uses. Thus (at p. 478),
"[a]ppellants claim that, as there was nothing for the Trustee to do, the
Statute executed the use. If that be true, the Statute executes the use in the
cestui que trust and not in the Trustee. . . . It is entirely clear that the deed
was a trust deed, and words of inheritance are not necessary."
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Cothran thus raises the question of a
"type six" limitation: "A serious question might be presented if it should
be held that [A] took only a life estate under the deed with remainder to
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is passive and words of inheritance appear nowhere in the deed, but
the intention of the grantor to convey an estate in fee simple is clear.
While a strong argument may be made that the grantee takes only
a life estate, it is to be hoped that he will be held to take in fee
simple. The reasonable rule would appear to be that whenever a
deed is made to a person as "trustee" on a passive use, by a benign
fiction the conveyance will be construed as a trust deed in accord
with the equity rule in order to escape the requirement of words of
inheritance. However, the answer to the question of the effect of
such a limitation must be regarded as doubtful in South Carolina.
In all the above situations, it would seem that the conveyance of
the legal title necessarily must have been made to a trustee rather
than to the party entitled to the beneficial interest, or else it may
not be construed as a trust deed. Thus, where the grant was made
directly to the beneficiary without words of inheritance, it was con-
strued as a common law deed despite a clause at the end of tile deed,
"I do hereby appoint and constitute D as trustee to manage the tract
of land ... for the purposes set forth in said deed of trust.
86
Deeds to Fiduciaries Other than Strict Trustees
In South Carolina it would seem that a deed which discloses that
the conveyance is made to a person other than a strict trustee for
fiduciary purposes will be held to convey the fee without words of
inheritance, if such a conveyance was intended by the parties. Ap-
parently, the conveyance is treated as one creating a trust of the
property for the third party beneficially entitled, and the word "heirs,"
therefore, is unnecessary.8 7
Assignments of Equitable Interests in Land
Are words of inheritance essential to the transfer of an equitable
interest in land? Suppose there is a devise to A and his heirs in
trust to pay the income to B for life, and then to convey to C and
the children. In that event, there being no duties imposed upon him as trustee,
the Statute would execute the trust, giving to him immediately a legal life
estate, and to the children a legal fee in the remainder. Under these cir-
cumstances would words of inheritance be necessary to carry the fee to the
remainderman? I have not considered this phase of the case fcr the reason
that, having concluded that the trust was not executed, the question suggested
becomes academic." (Emphasis added.)
86. Lanham v. Haynes, 101 S. C. 424, 85 S. E. 966 (1915). Cf. Burnett v.
Burnett, 17 S. C. 545 (1882) ; Lee v. Miles, 56 S. C. 428, 35 S. E. 2 (1900).
87. This statement may be too inclusive, but is intended to cover situations
where it is manifest that the conveyance is made to the grantee, not for his
individual benefit, but to serve other purposes. Probably included would be
transfers to executors and administrators, guardians, committees, assignees
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his heirs. During the life of B, C makes a gratuitous deed of his
interest "to X in fee simple." At B's death, is X entitled to a con-
veyance from the trustee in fee, or only for life, with remainder to
C and his heirs?
No South Carolina case raising the question has been found, but in
view of the Court's holding that words of inheritance ;ire unneces-
sary for the creation of an equitable estate in fee simple, it would ap-
pear that such words are unnecessary for the transfer thereof if the in-
tention to make such a transfer is shown by the deed. Both transac-
tions are within the purview of a court of equity, which traditionally
looks to the substance rather thafi to the form of the limitation.8 8
CHAPTER IV.
TwZ COVENANT TO STAND SEIsED TO USzS
An interesting development in South Carolina law is the State's
peculiarly indigenous version of the covenant to stand seised to uses.
In one aspect this ancient assurance has been extended in a manner
apparently unwarranted by precedent, with the happy result of sal-
vaging a considerable number of otherwise inadequate deeds. This
extension is found in the doctrine that a deed which can be construed
as a covenant to stand seised to uses requires no words of inheritance
to convey an estate in fee.8 9
On the other hand, the Court has drastically curtailed the useful-
ness of its innovation by a declaration that no deed can be so con-
strued unless there has been a "reservation of a life or similar estate
or equivalent to the grantor."9 0  Again, this second modification
finds no justification in precedent or the historical origin and pur-
for benefit of creditors, and the like. See Middleton v. Tabor, 46 S. C. 337,
351, 24 S. E. 282 (1896) (conveyance to assignee for benefit of creditors);
Sumter Fertilizer Co. v. Baker, 206 S. C. 446, 451, 34 S. E. 2d 681 (1945)
(conveyance to A, trustee, his successors and assigns, but neither the pur-
pose of the trust nor the name of the beneficiary stated in the deed). A
somewhat analogous situation was presented in Jeffery v. Ehrardt, 210 S. C.
519, 43 S. E. 2d 483 (1947), wherein it was held that the then present mem-
bers of a church whose charter of incorporation had expired held title in fee
simple to land conveyed after the expiration of the corporate charter to the
church, "its successors and assigns." The opinion does not comment upon the
omission from the deed of words of inheritance.
88. Hayward v. Ormsbee, 11 Wis. 3 (1860). ScoTT, TRuSTS § 132.
89. Bank of Prosperity v. Dominick, 116 S. C. 228, 107 S. E. 914 (1921);
Gaines v. Sullivan, 117 S. C. 475, 109 S. E. 276 (1921) ; First Carolinas joint
Stock Land Bank of Columbia v. Ford, 177 S. C. 40, 180 S. E. 562 (1935).
See Campbell v. Williams, 171 S. C. 279, 172 S. E. 142 (1933) ; Elliott v. Bris-
tow, 186 S. C. 544, 196 S. E. 378 (1938) ; James v. James, 189 S. C. 414, 1 S. E.
2d 494 (1939); Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 41 S. E. 2d
393 (1947).
90. Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 55, 41 S. E. 2d 393 (1947).
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poses of the covenant to stand seised to uses, it being a requisite
unique in South Carolina law.
Before considering our cases, a brief review of the origin of this
antique conveyancing device, and its purposes and limitations in Eng-
lish law, will be helpful in determining how the South Carolina "sport"
has mutated from its parentage.
Origin and Historical Background91
After the enactment in 1535 of the Statute of Uses,92 which oper-
ated to transform certain "uses," i. e., equitable interests, into legal
estates, conveyancers were quick to seize upon the possibilities af-
forded by the Statute of effecting conveyances of legal freehold estates
without the necessity of the formal transfer of possession known as
feoffment with livery of seisin. As a result of the Statute three
new methods of conveying legal freehold estates were developed:
the bargain and sale (which before the Statute had given the bar-
gainee only an equitable interest), the covenant to stand seised to
uses, and the lease and release. All of these modes of conveyance
are valid today in South Carolina, with only the added requirements
that they must be under seal and attested by two witnesses. 93 '
The bargain and sale is dependent for its effectiveness upon the
payment or recital of a valuable consideration, and, under the Eng-
lish law, the further requirement that it be enrolled in accordance
91. Authorities have not been cited in the general discussion of conveyancing
before and after the Statute of Uses. For good general surveys see BiGEZow,
AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY; MOYNIHAN, PRELIMINARY
SURVEY OF THE LAW Or REAr. PROPERTY; CASNER AND LEACH, CASES AND
TExT ON PROPERTY (1950).
92. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535); S. C. CODE OF LAWS §§ 67-8, 67-9, 67-10
(1952).
93. After the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II, c. 3, 1676), freehold estates or
terms for more than three years could not be created by parol, either by
livery of seisin or by conveyances operating under the Statute of Uses. S. C.
CODE OF LAWS §§ 57-306, 67-1 (1952) embody the equivalent South Carolina
sections of the Statute of Frauds, which are in effect the same, except that
the exempted leasehold interest is reduced from three years to one year. As
to the recording of a memorandum of livery of seisin, see CODE § 60-58.
In Craig v. Pinson, 1 Cheves 272 (S. C. 1840), it was held that the Act of
1795 [S. C. CODE OF LAWS § 57-251 (1952)] prescribing a statutory form of
deed, did not invalidate the forms theretofore in use in the State, but that
the Act does require attestation by two Witnesses, no matter what the form
of the deed. For a case recognizing the validity of a bargain and sale prior
to the Act, see Lessee of Rugge v. Ellis, 1 Bay 107 (S. C. 1790). For cases
subsequent to the Act, see Sanders v. Hartzog, 6 S. C. 479 (1876); Lorick
and Lowrance v. McCreery, 20 S. C. 424 (1884).
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with the Statute of Enrollments.9 4 This requirement of enrollment
was disliked, both because of its expense and because of the pub-
licity of the recording, and as a consequence, when the lease and
release was perfected a few years later, it became the most popular
method of conveyance in England, as it is reported95 to have been
in South Carolina prior to the Act of 1795 prescribing a statutory
form of deed.
The covenant to stand seised to uses apparently received its first
sanction thirty years after the Statute of Uses, when it was held
that a use was raised by a covenant to stand seised to the use of a
blood relation of the covenantor. 98 The use thus raised was exe-
cuted by the Statute,97 and conveyed the legal estate to the covenantee
in precisely the same manner that a use raised by a bargain and sale
conveyed title to the bargainee. Thus it is the equivalent of the
bargain and sale, the essential difference in the two, aside from the
non-applicability of the Statute of Enrollments to the former, being
that a bargain and sale is based upon a valuable consideration, while a
covenant to stand seised to uses is based upon a consideration of
blood or marriage.98 There was no requirement that there be a
94. The same session of Parliament that passed the Statute of Uses passed
also the Statute of Enrollments (27 Hen. VIII, c. 16, 1536), providing that
no bargain and sale of a freehold should be effective unless by indenture en-
rolled, L e., recorded. The Stahute applied,-only to bargains and sales, and
had no application to the later developed lease and release. under the Statute
of Uses, nor to the covenant to stand seised to uses. The Statute of Enroll-
ments has never been in force in South Carolina. Craig v. Pinson, 1 Cheves
272 (S. C. 1840). See also Reporter's Note to Chancellor v. Windham, 1
Rich. 161 (S. C. 1844); Kinsler v. Clark, 1 Rich. 170 (S. C. 1844).
95. "It is very certain that lease and release was the usual conveyance of
land in South Carolina, previous to 1795, notwithstanding other conveyances
were regarded as legally valid." Butler, J., in Craig v. Pinson, 1 Cheves 272,
275 (1840).
96. Sharington v. Strotton, Plowd. 298 (1565). In Callard v. Callard,
Moore 687 (1593), it was held that the use could be raised only by deed, a
parol covenant being insufficient.
97. "A twelfth species of conveyance, called a covenant to stand seized to
uses: by which a man, seized of lands, covenants in consideration of blood or
marriage that he will stand seized of the same to the use of his child, wife,
or kinsman; for life, in tail, or in fee. Here the statute executes at once the
estate; for the party intended to be benefitted, having thus acquired the use,
is thereby put at once into corporal possession of the land, without ever see-
ing it, by a kind of parliamentary magic. But this conveyance can only operate,
when made upon such weighty and interesting considerations as those of blood
or marriage." 2 BLACesxo 338.
98. "This conveyance has the same force and effect as a common deed of
bargain and sale; but the great distinction between them is, that the former
can only be made use of among near domestic relations, for it must be founded
on the consideration of blood or marriage." 4 KETr 493.
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reservation of a life estate in the grantor,99 nor, it seems, did the
covenant to stand seised to uses as such enjoy any exemption from
the common law requirement of words of inheritance to convey an
estate in fee simple. 00
The covenant to stand seised to uses fell into disuse in England
since, because of the prerequisite consideration of blood or marriage,
it could not be used for commercial transfers, or for family settle-
ments involving conveyances to trustees not related to the cove-
nantor.101 However, by the middle of the eighteenth century it was
settled in England that when the requisite consideration was present,
great liberality was to be exercised in construing a deed intended to
operate in another manner as a covenant to stand seised to uses,
when necessary to do so in order to effectuate the intention of the
grantor.102 Thus gratuitous deeds to relatives which were intended
99. In Crossing v. Scudamore, 2 Levinz 9 (1671), a gratuitous deed by a
father to his daughter was sustained as a covenant to stand seised to uses.
There was no life estate reserved to the father, nor is any mention 'made in
the opinion of any such supposed requirement. See also Vanhorn's Lessee v.
Harrison, 1 Dallas 137, 1 L. Ed. 70 (Pa. 1785); Adams v. Ross, 1 Vroom
505, 82 Am. Dec. 237 (N. J. 1860).
100. "The general rule is applicable to all conveyances governed by the rule
of the common law; for though prior to the statute of uses, the fee, in the view
of a court of chancery, passed by reason of the consideration, in a bargain and
sale, or covenant to stand seised to uses, without any express limitation to the
heirs; yet, when uses were by statute transferred into possession, and became
legal estates, they were subjected to the scrupulous and technical rules of the
courts of law. The example at law was followed by the courts of equity, and
the same legal construction applied by them to a conveyance to uses." 4 KENT
6. See 1 SANDERS, UsEs AND TRUSTS 122 (2d Amer. ed.), quoted in note 66,
supra; 4 CRUISE, DIGEST 440, tit. 32, c. 24, § 4 (1st Amer. ed. 1808). See
Vanhorn's Lessee v. Harrison, 1 Dallas 137, 1 L. Ed. 70 (Pa. 1785) (which
contains a detailed review of the authorities on this point); Adams v. Ross,
1 Vroom 505, 82 Am. Dec. 237 (N. J. 1860).
101. 4 KENT 493. See 7 HOLDSWORTH, HisroRy or ENGLISH LAw 360 (1926).
102. The leading case is Roe ex dem Wilkinson v. Tranmer, 2 Wils. 75
(1757), wherein Willes, C. J., said: "Although formerly, according to some
of the old cases, the mode or form of a conveyance was held material, yet in
later times, where the intent appears that the land shall pass, it has been ruled
otherwise, and certainly it is more considerable to make the intent good in pass-
ing the estate, if by any legal means it may 'be done, than by considering the
manner of passing it, to disappoint the intent and principal thing, which was
to pass the land." This case is cited in Dinkins v. Samuel, 10 Rich. 66, 68
(S. C. 1856), and in Sanders v. Hartzog, 6 S. C. 479, 485 (1876).
In South Carolina a more familiar statement of the same principle is that
of Justice Wardlaw in Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161, 167 (S. C. 1844):
"Large and more sensible rules of construction require that the whole deed
should be considered together, and effect be given to every part, if all can
stand together consistently with law; that an exposition favorable to the in-
tention should be made, if not contrary to law; that the intention should be
regarded as looking rather to the effect to be produced than the mode of pro-
ducing it; that too minute a stress should not be laid on particular words,
if the intention be clear- and that, if the deed cannot operate in the mode
contemplated by the parties, it should be construed in such manner as to oper-
ate, if possible, in some other way."
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to operate by way of common law conveyance, or as leases and re-
leases, were construed as covenants to stand seised to uses when
necessary to do so because possessory interests had been reserved
in the grantors.103
This, then, is the covenant to stand seised to uses as it originated
in England. Now let us consider how it has figured in the South
Carolina Cases.
South Carolina Cases
In accord with the English authorities, the Court in the earlier
South Carolina cases liberally construed deeds made to persons
within the required "consideration" as covenants to stand seised to
uses when necessary t6- do so in instances where grantors had re-
served life estates in themselves' , 105 Since there was no reason
to so interpret deeds except in such cases, every early South Caro-
lina case involving a deed construed as a covenant to stand seised to
uses exhibits the characteristic of a reservation of a life estate in the
grantor.
103. Prior to the Statute of Uses there could be no conveyance of a free-
hold estate to commence in futuro, due to the feudal requirement of livery of
seisin, which is a present and not a future act. GRAY, RUiZ AGAINST PER-
zrmrrms § 6 (4th ed.). See Note, 11 A. L. R. 23, 25 (1921), s. 76 A. L. R.
636 (1932). After the Statute a conveyance operating thereunder required no
livery of seisin, and therefore freehold estates to commence in futuro might
be created by way of springing use. Thus, such interests may be created by
a bargain and sale or a covenant to stand seised to uses. GRAY, op. cit. supra
§ 56 (1). Such an estate cannot be created by a lease and release, however,
since a release can be made only to a tenant already in possession. For a
very fine discussion of the subject of this note, see the opinion of Mr. Justice
Wardlaw in Chancellor v. Windharm, 1 Rich. 161, 42 Am. Dec. 411 (S. C.
1844).
104. Pledger v. Adm'rs. of David, 4 Desaus. Eq. 264 (S. C. 1812) ; Milledge
v- Lamar, 4 Desaus. Eq. 617 (S. C. 1816); Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich.
161 (S. C. 1844); Kinsler v. Clark, 1 Rich. 170 (-S_ C. 1844); Dinkis v.
Samuel, 10 Rich. 66 (S. C. 1856); Bowman v. Lobe, 14 Rich. Eq. 271 (S. C.
1868); Watson v. Watson, 24 S. C. 228, 58 Am. Rep. 247 (1886); Jacobs v.
Mutual Ins. Co. of Greenville, 52 S. C. 110, 29 S_ E. 533 (1898); Rembert
v. Veto, 89 S. C. 198, 71 S. E. 959, 2 A. L. R. 918 (1911) ; Bethea v. Allen,
101 S. C. 350, 85 S. E. 903 (1915).
105. In a number of cases the South Carolina Court has sustained the validi-
ty of deeds reserving possessory interests in the grantors without resorting
to the concept of the covenant to stand seised to uses, or the bargain and sale.
See, among other cases, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 1 Mill C. R. 48 (S. C. 1817);
Dawson v. Dawson, Rice Eq. 243 (S. C. 1839); Cribb v. Rogers, 12 S. C. 564
(1879); Sumner v. Harrison, 54 S. C. 353, 32 S.-E. 572 (1899); Cook v.
Cooper, 59 S. C. 560; 38 S. E. 218 (1901) ; Senterfeit v. Shealy, 71 S. C. 259,
51 S. E. 142 (1905); Merck v. Merck, 83 S. C. 329, 65 S_ E. 347 (1909);
Steele v. Smith, 84 S. C. 464, 66 S. E. 200 (1910) ; Watson v. Cox, 117 S. C.
24, 108 S. . 168 (1921) ; McDaniel v. Connor, 206 S. C. 96, 33 S. E. 2d 75
(1945).
The rationale of these cases, first expressed in Jenkins v. Jenkins, sumra,
seems to be that if the mere use of the property for the life of the grantor
is reserved, rather than a life estate, the deed need not be construed as a
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In 1923, the covenant to stand seised to uses was given a new
vitality in South Carolina by the Court's ruling in Bank of Pros-
covenant to stand seised to uses, since the entire fee immediately passes, sub-
ject only to the reservation of the use for the life of the grantor. Presumably
the use reserved is then executed by the Statute of Uses to vest a legal life
estate in the grantor. In Cribb v. Rogers, supra, the Court did not find it
necessary to determine whether the use reserved was executed by the Statute.
If the reserved use is executed by the Statute, it would appear that the con-
veyance of the legal estate to the grantee must be construed as effectuated
by virtue of' the statutory form of conveyance rather than by virtue of the
Statute of Uses, or else there would be a use upon a use, and the use to the
grantor for life would not be executed as a legal estate. See note 67, supra.
The theoretical result of the distinction made by the Court between the reserva-
tion of the use and the reservation of a life estate would seem to be that in
the former the use for the grantor arises out of the estate conveyed the grantee,
while in the case of the reservation of a life estate, the estate conveyed the
grantee results from an executed use arising out of the estate of the grantor
(a covenant to stand seised to uses or a bargain and sale).
The deeds in issue in Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S. C. 132 (1881), and Steele v.
Smith, supra, involved, reservations of the use of the property rather than
reservations of express life estates. In both cases it was held that the deeds
could not be construed as covenants to stand scised to uses, since the fee
in presenti was conveyed to the grantee, charged only with the use for life
in favor of the grantor. See also Sumner v. Harrison, supra. -
However, this subtle distinction has not been observed in all the cases.
Thus, in Gaines v. Sullivan, 117 S. C. 475, 109 S. E. 276 (1921), the deed
was construed as a covenant to stand seised to uses despite the objection of
counsel (see summary of appellants' brief at p. 476 of the South Carolina
Report) that since only the use of the property was reserved, the deed could
not be construed as a covenant to stand seised to uses.
Where the expressly declared inteition has been that "this deed shall not
take effect until my death," or other words of futurity, the cases in the main
have construed such deeds as covenants to stand seised to uses. See Chan-
cellor v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161 (S. C. 1844); Kinsler v. Clark, 1 Rich. 170
(S. C. 1844); Dinkins v. Samuel, 10 Rich. 66 (S. C. 1856) (where also the
use for life was expressly reserved); Bowman v. Lobe, 14 Rich. Eq. 271
(S. C. 1868) (where also the use for life was expressly reserved) ; Rembert
v. Veto, 89 S. C. 193, 71 S. E. 959 (1911) ; Bethea v. Allen, 101 S. C. 350,
85 S. E. 903 (1915).
In Merck v. Merck, 83 S. C. 329, 65 S. E. 347 (1909); a clause in the
deed provided, "this deed is not to go into effect until after my death." The
validity of the deed was sustained, apparently on the ground that there was
a present passage of the fee, rather than on the theory of a covenant to stand
seised to uses. In Watson v. Watson, 24 S. C. 228 (1886), the deed stated,
"[t]his paper not to be in force until I desire to act." The quoted language
was construed as a reservation of a life estate, and the validity of the deed
sustained as a covenant to stand seised to uses.
The distinction as drawn in the South Carolina cases between a covenant
to stand seised to uses and a present passage of the fee charged with a use
in favor of the grantor in most instances is immaterial, since under either con-
struction the deed is valid. The differentiation becomes crucial only when it
is necessary to construe the deed as a covenant to stand seised to uses in
order to evade the requirements of words of inheritance. In this context it
seems the distinction will be ignored and the deed construed as a covenant to
stand seised to uses, regardless of the language. of the reservation. Gaines
v. Sullivan, supra. This seems to be conceded in Cresswell v. Bank of Green-
wood, 210 S. C. 47, 55, 41 S. E. 2d 393 (1947), wherein the Court recognizes
that the South Carolina cases have construed as covenants to stand seised to
uses deeds. reserving "a life or similar estate or equivalent to the grantor."
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perity v. Dominick,'0 s that words of inheritance are unnecessary in
this form of conveyance. The gratuitous pronouncement to this
effect by Mr. Justice Cothran- the opinion admits that the circuit
decree could be sustained on more orthodox grounds- is the more
noteworthy in that all of the authorities cited by him107 in support
of the proposition are South Carolina cases involving or stating
the rule as to the construction of trust deeds creating equitable in-
terests. In such cases words of inheritance are unnecessary to con-
vey the fee.' 0 8 But is a covenant to stand seized to uses a trust deed
creating an equitable interest? Upon prior authority ° 9, 110 the
answer would appear to be that it is not, unless some trust has been
declared in the deed other than the mere declaration of the grantor
to the use of the grantee. However, regardless of the soundness of
106. 116 S. C. 228, 107 S. E. 914 (1921).
107. Foster v. Glover, 46 S. C. 522, 24 S. E. 370 (1896) ; Hunt v. Nolen,
46 S. C. 356, 24 S. E. 310 (1896); McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S. C. 555,
29 S. E. 403 (1898) ; Holder v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 91 S. E. 97 (1917).
108. See Chapter III, p. 328, supra.
109. Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161 (S. C. 1844); Kinsler v. Clark, 1
Rich. 170 (S. C. 1844).; Watson v. Watson, 24 S. C. 228 (1885). See notes
97, 100, supra. But see the comment of Chancellor Desaussure in Milledge
v. Lamar, 4 Des. Eq. 617, 638 (S. C. 1816), wherein he states that a widow
would not be dowable in lands conveyed to her husband by a deed in form
a covenant to stand seised to uses, since a widow- is not dowable of a trust
estate. Presumably the learned Chancellor overlooked the fact that the
Statute would execute the use to vest a legal estate in the husband. In at
least one earlier South Carolina case both the Circuit Judge and the Supreme
Court expressed the opinion that a covenant to stand seised to uses requires
words of inheritance, and further, that a deed not reserving a possessory in-
terest in the grantor may be so construed. See Bradford v. Griffin, 40 S. C.
468, 19 S. E. 76 (1894).
110. The explanation of Mr. Justice Cothran's treatment of a covenant to stand
seised to uses reserving a life estate to the grantor as a trust deed would
seem to be as follows. The deed is construed as creating a springing use in
favor of the grantee, which use is not executed by the Statute of Uses until
the death of the grantor, who in the meantime retains the legal title. See 1
Simts, FuuRu IqT nmxsTs, § 30; 2 CRuisn, DIGEST 355, tit. 16, c. 5, § 23.
However, there is authority that the declared uses are immediately executed
by the Statute to vest a legal life estate in the grantor, and a legal remainder
in the grantee. Kinsler v. Clark, 1 Rich. 170 (S. C. 1844) ; Brewer v. Hardy,
22 Pick. 376, 33 Am. Dec. 747 (Mass. 1839).
If the second construction is adopted, it would seem that no equitable in-
terests are created by the deed, the fee passing in presenti, and, therefore, that
words of inheritance are necessary to convey the fee to the grantee. That
such words are essential in the case of a bargain and sale operating under the
Statute of Uses was held in Lorick and Lowrance v. McCreery, 20 S. C. 424
(1884).
However, if it be considered that the grantor retains the legal title until
his death, subject to the unexecuted use in the grantee, in a sense it may
be said that he is trustee for the grantee on an unexecuted use, and therefore,
that the deed comes within the South Carolina exception in favor of trust
deeds. See Chapter III, supra. This would seem to be the basis of Justice
Cothran's characterization of a covenant to stand seised to uses with a life
estate reserved to the grantor as a trust deed.
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the 'doctrine as founded in precedent, subsequent cases 1 have by
dicta and decision firmly rooted it in South Carolina law.
Quite aside from any academic quibbling as to the want of prece-
dent supporting the exception, no one can deny its beneficial effect in
the State's law." 2 The South Carolina version of the covenant to
stand seized to uses serves its purpose where there is the greatest
danger of a lawful intent of a grantor being thwarted by an anachro-
nistic rule of law. For of all the inter vivos land transfers most likely
to run afoul of the jargon of the rule requiring words of inheritance
to convey a fee, the gratuitous conveyance to relatives of the grantor
is most vulnerable. There are two reasons for this.
First, while in a commercial transaction one of the parties most
likely will be represented by an attorney cognizant of the necessity
of embodying words of inheritance in the deed, quite often the grantor
is his own conveyancer in a donative transaction. The type of lay-
man who draws his own deed is the unsophisticate who, like Mr.
Bumble, cannot realize that the law is such "a ass, a idiot," as to say
that land given to his daughter "absolutely," "forever," or "in fee
simple" is not the same thing as land given to .his daughter "and her
heirs."
The second reason for the happy consequence of the South Caro-
lina holding that words of inheritance are unnecessary in a covenant
to stand seised to uses is that, as is discussed in a subsequent sec-
tion, n1 while the Court has been quick to recognize the bill in equity
of a grantee for value for a reformation of a deed so as to embody
omitted words of inheritance, no comparable enthusiasm has been
displayed for the son or daughter who has paid no money for a
transfer by his or her parent as against other heirs of the donor. Al-
though a suit for reformation is costly and time consuming, at least
by following the procedure a purchaser for value is assured of getting
that for which he bargained. However, the donee who has been
given land by a kinsman may find the chancellor's door barred, and
thus in large measure lose the value of the gift.
After the introduction of the doctrine that words of inheritance
are unnecessary in a covenant to stand seised to uses, it might well
111. See cases, note 89, supra.
112. "The doctrine of covenant to stand seized to uses has been a veritable
haven of refuge for many whose estates were about to be lost by reason of
the strict application of the common law doctrine requiring words of inheri-
tance to convey a fee, especially because of the exceedingly able and discriminat-
ing opinions by Mr. Justice Cothran commencing with the Bank of Prosperity
v. Dominick, . . . ." Lide, Circuit Judge, James v. James, 189 S. C. 414,
419, 1 S. E. 2d 494 (1939).
113. Seep. 359, infra.
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have been reasoned that these cases, in conjunction with the deci-
sions sanctioning equitable reformation in favor of a grantee for
value, in South Carolina at last had undermined the archaic com-
mon law rule without benefit of statutory enactment. For why can-
n6t every gratuitous conveyance made to the grantor's wife or blood
relation be construed as a covenant to stand seised to uses when
necessary to do so in order to obviate the requirement of words of
inheritance?
The answer to this question must be that in South Carolina not
every deed in form a covenant to stand seized to uses will be recog-
nized as within the scope of the ann~ounced exemption of the covenant
to stand seized to uses from the requirement of words of inheritance.
This is shown by the fact that in two fairly recent cases'1 4 the Court
refused to construe deeds without reservations of life estates as cove-
nants to stand seised to uses not requiring words of inheritance to
convey the fee. The reason for the Court's refusal to so construe
the deeds is not spelled out in these cases, but in a subsequent case it
was declared that no deed can be construed as a covenant to stand
seised to uses unless there has been a reservation of a "life or simi-
lar estate or equivalent to the grantor."" 5 Stated in this manner, the
requirement seems an unnecessarily restrictive one which is not logi-
cally required by the South Carolina precedents.1"6 It is to be hoped
114. Gowdy v. Kelley, 185 S. C. 415, 194 S. E. 156 (1937) ; Elliott v. Bristow,
186 S. C. 544, 196 S. E. 378 (1938).
115. Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 55, 41 S. E. 2d 393
(1947). In Watson v. Watson, 24 S. C. 228 (1886), the Court (per Mr.
Chief Justice Simpson) had stated (at p. 235) that a covenant to stand seised
to uses "may create a freehold in futuro;" not that it must create a freehold
in futuro. However, certain other language in the opinion, unless read in
context, is subject to possible interpretation that the creation of an estate
in futuro is an essential element of a covenant to stand seised to uses. Sus-
ceptible of the same interpretation is the following passage from Mr. Justice
Cothran's opinion in Bank of Prosperity v. Dominick, 116 S. C. 228, 235, 107
S. E. 914 (1921) : "That it has all the elements of such a covenant as laid
down in the case of Watson v. Watson . . . and the cases there cited is ap-
parent: (1) Consideration of natural love and affection; (2) blood relation-
ship; (3) enjoyment of fee simple in future."
If in the Watson and Dominick cases the Court meant to state that a deed
which does not create a freehold estate in futuro cannot be construed as a
covenant to stand seised to uses, the statement is not supported by the authori-
ties. See note 99, supra. However, even assuming that this is the Court's
meaning, such a requirement does not necessarily entail ',the reservation of
a life or similar estate or equivalent to the grantor." See note 116, infra.
116. The explanation of these later cases would appear to be that the rule
as earlier announced, that a deed in form a covenant to stand seised to uses
conveys the fee without words of inheritance, was too broadly stated. The
South Carolina view seems to be that it is not every covenant to stand seised
to uses (defining the term in its historical sense) which so operates, but only
those where the declared uses are not immediately executed by the Statute
of Uses. Thus, a deed conveying the fee after a reservation of a life estate is
construed as a springing use to the grantee, which use is not immediately
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that in subsequent cases the stated requirement of a reservation of a
life estate in the grantor will be modified to accord with the rationale
of the exception as laid down by Mr. Justice Cothran in the Dominick
case.
executed by the Statute; ergo, the deed is a trust deed. See Note 110, supra.
It would seem that the same result should follow, if the grant of the fee
is to a person or persons not in esse. For example, A covenants to stand
seised for the use of his son, B (a bachelor), for life, and then for the use
of the children of his son, B, in fee. Here it would seem that the Statute of Uses
cannot execute the declared use in remainder until cestni qt, :se is in esse,
i. e., until the children of B are born, and that the legal title must remain in
A pending its execution by the Statute upon the birth of the children of B.
1 CRUISE, DIGEST 429, tit. 11, c. 3, § 29; 2 WASHBURN, REA PaoPEPRTY 115,
273. See Young v. McNeill, 78 S. C. 143, 153, 59 S. E. 98o (1907). In such
case legal title would be in A upon a declared use for another, thus making
A -under the South Carolina view-a "trustee" for the iu..born children of
B. Therefore, it would seem that no words of inheritance %v;ould be neces-
sary to convey the fee to the children, despite the fact that the deed reserved
no life estate to the grantor, A.
That this was the view of Mr. Justice Cothran seems clear from the following
passage in his concurring opinion in Wallace v. Taylor, 127 S. C. 121, 140,
120 S. E. 838 (1924) : "Another view of the matter: The deed contains all
the elements of a covenant to stand seized: (1) Consideration of love and
affection . . . (2) Blood relationship (3) Enjoyment of the fee simple in the
future. (Both of the facts that the children were to be bor., and that the
interest was subject to a life estate in the grantor, establish this element.)"
(Emphasis added.)
Further, this interpretation of the exception will explain the Supreme Court's
unqualified approval of Circuit fudge Townsend's decree in Campbell v. Wil-
liams, 171 S. C. 279, 172 S. E. 142 (1933). An alternative ground of the
decision of Judge Townsend was that the deed in issue (from a father to
his daughter for life, and then to her surviving issue), which reserved no
life estate to the grantor, could be construed as a covenant to stand seised to
uses requiring no words of inheritance to convey the fee.
Certain cases decided prior to Bank of Prosperity v. Dominick, 116 S. C.
228, 107 S. E. 914 (1921), would seem at variance with the construction of
such deeds as covenants to stand seised to uses. See Dickert v. Dickert, 12
Rich. 396 (S. C. 1859); McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S. C. 555, 29 S. E.
403 (1898) ; MeMillan v. Hughes, 88 S. C. 296, 70 S. E. 804 (1911) ; Lanham
v. Haynes, 101 S. C. 424, 85 S. E. 966 (1914). However, these cases would
appear not to be controlling. In none of them did the court consider the
proposition that the deeds in issue might be construed as covenants to stand
seised to uses not requiring words of inheritance, all of them having been
decided prior to the first announcement of the exception in the Dominick case.
It should be noted, however, that in the McMichael case counsel for the ap-
pellant contended that the deed was not a covenant to stand seised to uses
(see summary of briefs in 51 S. C. at p. 556), though this contention was
not commented upon by the Court.
Bradford v. Griffin, 40 S. C. 468, 19 S. E. 76 (1894), might be considered
a case holding by implication that a deed in form a covenant to stand seised
to uses not reserving a life estate to the grantor needs words of inheritance
to convey the fee. However, the basis of the decision is on other grounds.
Moreover, it would seem that the opinion therein at best is dubious authority
for any proposition. See the comment upon this case in GRAY, RULE ACAINST
P uritrxns § 398.1 (4th ed.).
It would seem that the deed involved in Groce v. Benson, 168 S. C. 145,
167 S. E. 151 (1933), was one which properly should have been construed
as a covenant to stand seised to uses requiring no words of inheritance. See
Mellichamp v. Mellichamp, 28 S. C. 125, 130, 5 S. E. 333 (1888). Although
the Master in Equity and the Circuit Judge rejected plaintiff's contention
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In summary, the following prerequisites appear to be necessary
before a deed can be construed as a covenant to stand seised to uses
not requiring words of inheritance to convey a legal fee simple estate
in South Carolina:
1. The covenantor must have a legal estate in fee siinple, either
qualified or absolute. It seems that the estate of the covenantor
need not be one in possession, but may be in reversion or re-
mainder.
11 7
2. The covenant to stand seised to uses must be in form a deed,
under seal and with two witnesses.11 8
3. It seems that the covenantee must be either the spouse or a
blood relation of the covenantor.1 1 9
that the deed might be so construed, the opinion of the Supreme Court notes
that the plaintiff expressly waived this issue on appeal, and the point, there-
fore, was not decided.
The decisions in Gowdy v. Kelley, 185 S. C. 415, 194 S. R. 156 (1937), and
Elliott v. Bristow, 186 S. C. 544, 196 S. R. 378 (1938), in no way conflict
with this view since in both cases there were neither reservations of life
estates to the grantors, nor gifts of the fee to a person or class of persons
not in esse. In both the Gowdy case and the Bristow case the remainders
in fee were to ascertained persons, and there being no reservations of life
estates in the grantors, the Statute immediately executed the declared uses.
The only case the writer has found in which it is stated that the reserva-
tion of a life estate to the grantor is necessary before a deed may be con-
strued as a covenant to stand seised to uses not requiring words of inheritance
is Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 55, 41 S. E. 2d 393 (1947).
See note 115, supra. However, a reading of the -opinion therein will at once
disclose that the case was properly decided on other grounds, and that the
remarks anent the construction of a deed as a covenant to stand seised to
uses are in the nature of obiter dict-nz. It is to be hoped that this will be
recognized by the Court when the matter is squarely presented for adjudication.
In summation, it seems that the logic of the South Carolina doctrine
exempting certain deeds in f6rm covenants to stand seised to uses from the
requirement of words of inheritance should apply, not only when there is a
reservation of a possessory interest in the grantor, but also when the gift of
the fee is to a person or class of persons not in esse at the execution and delivery
of the deed. In the latter, as well as in the former case, the declared use in
fee is not immediately executed by the Statute, and, legal title remaining in the
grantor, it would seem that the deed should be construed as a trust deed under
the South Carolina view as expressed in Bank of Prosperity v. Dominick, supra.
117. The Statute of Uses, Note 92, supra, by express language contemplates
"seisin" of reversions and remainders. See also 2 WAss~urx, l AL. PRoP-
rTY 114 (4th ed.) ; 1 CRUIsE, DiGtST 428, tit. 11, c. 3, § 25 (1st Amer. ed.
1808); 4 CRuisE, DIGEST 188, tit. 32, c. 12, § 9.
118. See notes 93, 96, supra.
119. See the cases cited in note 104, surpra. In Singleton v. Bremar, 4 McC.
12 (S. C. 1826), it was held that a deed by a man to his mistress could not
be sustained as a covenant to stand seised to uses. Even though the weight of
authority is to the contrary, it seems that in South Carolina a covenant by
a father for his illegitimate child will raise a use. 'Milledge v. Lamar, 4 Des.
Eq. 617 (S. C. 1816). Cf. Dinkins v. Samuel, 10 Rich. 66 (S. C. 1856),
where the grantee, a cousin of the grantor, was alleged to be illegitimate. See
S. C. CODE OF LAWS § 19-53 (1952) providing that an illegitimate child may
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4. It seems that the deed must be upon an express consideration
of love and affection, or, if upon a monetary consideration, must
also state the relationship between the parties. If no considera-
tion or relationship is expressed in the deed, the fact that the
consideration was one of love and affection may be proved.'
20
5. The latest declaration of the rule is that there must be a "reser-
vation of a life or similar estate or equivalent to the grantor."'
2'.
By the term "similar estate or equivalent" it seems that the
Court is referring to the situation where the use of the land is
reserved by the grantor, rather than an express life estate.
12 2
Since the South Carolina theory apparently is that the exemption
from the requirement of words of inheritance results from the
creation by the deed of a springing use which is not immedi-
ately executed by the Statute of Uses,123 it would seem that the
inherit from his or her mother. The relationship of cousin is sufficient con-
sideration. Dinkins v. Samuel, 10 Rich. 66 (S. C. 1856).
Where the relationship is by affinity, e. g., a son-in-law, the cases are in
conflict as to whether a use will be raised. See the authorities discussed in
19 Am. Jur. 569 § 111. In Jordan v. Neese, 36 S. C. 295, 15 S. E. 202
(1892) the Circuit Judge construed a deed from a woman to her son-in-law
as a covenant to stand seised to uses. The Supreme Court held on other
grounds that the deed could not be so construed, but did not comment on the
sufficiency of the consideration.
It has been stated that a covenant to stand seised to uses cannot be made
for the benefit of persons not in esse, since they have not contributed to the
consideration when the covenant is made. 4 K.NT 496. See Bradford v.
Griffin, 40 S. C. 468, 471, 19 S. E. 76 (1894). However, it seems that the
law is to the contrary. GRAY, RumE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 62 (4th ed.).
Among other South Carolina cases, see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Cothran in Wallace v. Taylor, 127 S. C. 121, 141, 120 S. E. 838 (1924).
120. "It seems to have been considered, that if a money consideration be ex-
pressed in a deed, which has the form of a covenant to stand seized, no use
will arise, even although the covenantee be shown to be the son of the cove-
nantor, unless the deed be enrolled, so as to be effectual as a bargain and
sale . . . but it is clearly otherwise if the deed be expressed to be in con-
sideration of money, and that the covenantee is the son, or be without any
consideration expressed, and a proper one be averred and proved." Chancellor
v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161, 165 (S. C. 1844). See 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 359 (1926).
In Massachusetts it has been held that a deed expressing only a pecuniary
consideration may be construed as a covenant to stand seised to uses if con-
sanguinity between the parties can be proved. Brewer v. Hardy, 22 Pick. 376,
33 Am. Dec. 747 (Mass. 1839). The same court has further held that a
deed for a valuable consideration between strangers may be so construed.
Trafton v. Hawes, 102 Mass. 533, 3 Am. Rep. 494 (1869) ; Ricker v. Brown,
183 Mass. 424, 67 N. R. 353 (1903). See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
§ 57 (4th ed.). Cf. dictum in Singleton v. Bremar, 4 McC. 12, 15 (S. C.
1826), to the effect that a valuable consideration will support a covenant
to stand seised to uses. No other South Carolina case expressing this view
has been found.
121. Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 55, 41 S. E. 2d 393
(1947).
122. See note 105, supra.
123. See note 110, supra.
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same result should follow if the covenantor retained seisin for
any perceptible interval of time-be it a term of years' 4 or
even the period of an hour. Moreover, the logic of the exemp-
tion would appear equally to apply even though the grantor re-
served no possessory interest in himself, if the declared use in
fee was for the benefit of a person or persons not in esse.125
6. Even though words of inheritance are not necessary to convey
an estate in fee simple if the deed is construed as a covenant to
stand seized to uses, yet it must appear from the deed that the
intention of the grantor was to convey such an estate.-2 6
CHAPUR V.
"Issuz" AND "Cgr.LDRI " AS WoRDs or LIMITATION
While adhering to the common law rule that the word "heirs"
is necessary for the creation of a fee simple estate by deed, the South
Carolina Court has abandoned all precedent in determining what
language is sufficient to create the State's fabulous fee simple condi-
tional.12 7 This estate was abolished in England in 1285 by the Statute
De Donis,12 8 which supplanted the fee simple conditional with the
fee tail. De Donis has never been adopted in South Carolina 129 and
therefore the State purports to follow what is believed to have been
the law as it existed in feudal England before the year 1285. Since
no comprehensive authority of such respectable antiquity is available
today, the precedents in the main have been found in the third hand
124. "As to a covenant to stand seized, there has never been a doubt since
it was recognized as an effectual form of conveyance, that by it, when made
upon proper consideration, and properly drawn, the covenantor might covenant
to stand seized to his own use for a term, or for his life, and afterwards to
the use of the covenantee; and that the uses which would arise from the
covenant would be executed by the Statute of Uses." (Emphasis added.) Ward-
law, J., in Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161, 165 (S. C. 1844).
125. See note 116, supra.
126. See James v. James, 189 S. C. 414, 420, 1 S. E. 2d 494 (1939).
127. For a discussion of certain characteristics of the fee simple conditional
as it exists in South Carolina, see note 146, infra. The estate also exists in
Iowa, may exist in Oregon, and may have existed in Nebraska prior to a
statute in 1941. See 2 Pow iz, rZAI PROPERTY § 195; 1 A.mancAN LAW OF
PROmTY § 2.11.
128. 13 Rdw. I c. 1. The Statute had no application to the creation of
fee simple conditional estates in annuities and in certain copyholds. See Note,
114 A. L. R. 602, 626, 627 (1938).
129. See, among other cases, Murrell v. Mathews, 2 Bay 397 (S. C.
1802); Cruger v. Heyward, 2 Des. 94, 112 (S. C. 1802); Warnock v. Wight-
man, 1 Brevard 331, 363 (S. C. 1804) ; Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210
S. C. 47, 53, 41 S. E. 2d 393 (1947).
37
Means: Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land in South Carolina: A Title
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
SOUTH CAROuNA LAW QuARTERLY
conjectures of Coke and Blackstone written centuries after the
event.130
Both the fee simple conditional and its statutory counterpart, the
fee tail, are estates of inheritance, and at common law it was clear
that neither could be created by deed unless "heirs" had been used
in the limitation to the grantee.' 31 The word "heirs" has never been
required to create an estate of inheritance by way of devise,'3 2 how-
ever, and a devise to "A and his issue", in the absence of other quali-
fying language, creates an estate tail if De Donis is in force,13 3 and
in South Carolina a fee simple conditional.'
3 4
By a fortunate blunting of the rigorous distinction traditionally
made between inter vivos conveyances and devises, the South Caro-
lina Court in one situation has held that language which in a will is
sufficient to create a fee simple conditional, when used in a deed is
sufficient to create the same estate, even though the word "heirs"
has not been used. Thus in South Carolina a deed of land "to A
and his issue" creates a fee simple conditional1 '35 in the absence of
130. "The terms used . . . are precisely those which Lord Coke, and on
his authority, Sir William Blackstone, define, A creating, at common law,
a qualified or conditional fee. But there is much difficulty in ascertaining at
this day all the properties of this estate; for, although its outlines are pre-
served, the estate itself having been entirely annihilated by the statute de
donis, few traces of its peculiarities are to be found in the English books. .. -
We are, therefore, driven to the necessity of adopting a rule applicable to,
this abstruse subject, without any other aid than the glimmering lights fur-
nished by the antiquated English authorities; and I feel all the responsibility
of such an undertaking." Mr. Justice Johnson in Jones v. Postell, Harper 92,
93 (S. C. 1824).
See the characterization of the treatment in the Restatement of the Law
of Property of certain aspects of the fee simple conditional estate as "a re-
statement of purely fanciful law, not supported by any cases whatever, in
many situations which might arise but which never have been passed upon
by the courts." 1 AMfERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.12 (1952). For an
example of the confused state of the authorities, both ancient and modern, see
the query whether the issue to whom an estate in fee simple conditional has
descended can convey in fee simple before they themselves have had children,
discussed in note 146(2), infra.
131. Co. LiTr. 20b; 2 BLACKSTONE 114; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 38
(3rd ed.).
132. Co. Lirt. 9b; 2 BLAcKsToNt 108; 1 TIFrA.Y, RFAL PROPERTY § 31
(3rd ed.).
133. 2 JARMAN, WILLs (6th ed. 1930); 1 TIFFANY. REAL PROPERTY § 43
(3rd ed.).
134. Whitworth v. Stuckey, 1 Rich. Eq. 404 (S. C. 1845) ; Baxter v. Early,
131 S. C. 374, 127 S. E. 607 (1925); Lucas v. Schumpert, 192 S. C. 208, 6
S. E. 2d 17 (1939).
135. Holman v. Wesner, 67 S. C. 307, 45 S. E. 20c -1903) : Williams v.
Gause, 83 S. C. 265, 65 S. E. 241 (1909); Arledge v. Arledge. 86 S. C. 237,
68 S. E. 549 (1910) ; Sligh v. Sligh, 99 S. C. 307, 83 S. E. 26) (1914) ; Antley
v. Antley, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S. E. 31 (1925) ; Davis v Srauss. 173 S. C. 99,
174 S. E. 908 (1934); Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S. C. 409. 2c, S. E. 2d 673 (1944)_
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other language indicating that "issue" was intended as a word of
purchase. 136
Parenthetically it may be remarked that no satisfactory reason has
been advanced why, if words of inheritance are unnecessary in the
creation of a fee simple conditional by deed, they are not equally
superfluous in the inter vivos creation of a fee simple. The assigned
reason for the resultant fee simple conditional is that to effectuate the
intention of the grantor, "issue" is construed as a word of limitation
when used in a deed, analogous to the construction given it when
used in a devise. If we are to apply the testamentary test of the
sufficiency of words of limitation, it is clear that at common law "in
fee simple," or "forever" are sufficient words of limitation to create
a fee simple by way of devise,3 7  Carried to its logical conclusion,
the South Carolina heresy inescapably reaches the result that a deed
to A "in fee simple" means what it says, rather than meaning "to A
for life". However, the cases have not so held.
A further assimilation of limitations in deeds to the rules govern-
ing devises is found in the Court's application of the Rule in W ild's
Case to inter vivos conveyances. The constructional rule established
by that celebrated case133 has thus Been stated :139 "First, if there
is an immediate devise to A and his children and A has no children,
the will is construed as creating an estate tail in A; second, if A has
children, A and his children take equally as joint tenants for life."
In South Carolina the application of the rule to a devise gives the
devisee an estate in fee simple conditional if he has no children at
the death of the testator.1 40 If the devisee has children, since the
Act of 1824141 establishing that a devise is in fee unless an intention
136. In the following cases it was held that other language prevented
"issue" from being construed as a word of limitation: McCorkle v. Black, 7
Rich. Eq. 407 (S. C. 1855) (devise); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 16 S. C. 290
(1881) (devise); Gadsden v. Desportes, 39 S. C. 131, 17 S. E. 706 (1893)
(devise); Porter v. Lancaster, 91 S. C. 300, 74 S. E. 374 (1912) (deed);
Thomson v. Russell, 131 S. C. 529, 128 S. E. 421 (1925) (devise); Campbell
v. Williams, 171 S. C. 279, 172 S. E. 142 (1933) (deed).
137. See note 46, supra.
138. 6 Co. Rep. 16b (1599).
139. 2 Srzms, FuTuan INTMSTs § 401. See Note, 161 A. L. R. 612, 615
(1946). The rule is a rule of construction. See James v. James, 189 S. C.
414, 420, 1 S. E. 2d 494 (1939).
140. Simpson v. Antley, 137 S. C. 380, 135 S. E. 469 (1926). See among
other cases, Reeder v. Spearman, 6 Rich. Eq. 88 (S. C. 1853); Renwick v.
Smith, 11 S. C. 294 (1879). The rule as applied to a bequest gives the le-
gatee an absolute interest. Shearman v. Angel, Bailey Eq. 351 (S. C. 1831);
Renwick v. Smith, supra.
141. S. C. Com OF LAWS § 19-232 (1952).
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to create a lesser estate is apparent, the parent and the children born
at the death of the testator take as cotenants in fee simple.
14
In two cases 143 the Court has applied this rule to limitations in
deeds "to A and his children." In both cases the grantees had no
children at the time of the conveyances. It was held that estates
in fee simple conditional were created, "children" being construed
as equivalent to "heirs of the body," and, therefore, a word of limi-
tation. However, this construction was not applied when the limita-
tion was "to A and his children, their heirs and assigns." The super-
added words of limitation were apparently treated as establishing
that "children" was intended as a word of purchase, and there being
no children, the grantee was held to take in fee simple. 14
In applying the Rule in Wild's Case to the construction of a deed,
it appears that if the grantee has children at the time of the convey-
ance, "children" is a word of purchase and, therefore, only con-
current life estates are created by the deed for want of words of
limitation. 145 For purposes of the title advocate, therefore, the Rule
can be used to evade the requirement of words of inheritance in a
deed only when the grantee has no children at the time of the con-
veyance to him. And even where the rule can be applied, it must
be borne in mind that the estate created is a fee simple conditional
rather than a fee simple.
The practical benefit of the abandonment of the requirement of
the word "heirs" in the creation by deed of a fee simple conditional
is readily apparent. It has made possible the salvage of otherwise
defective deeds in which draftsmen have confused "issue" or "chil-
dren" with "heirs" or "heirs of the body." While a fee simple
142. Coogler v. Crosby, 89 S. C. 508, 72 S. E. 149 (1911). SrIms, FuTuRE
INmusTs §§ 404, 409. See, among other cases, Feemster v. Good, 12 S. C.
573 (1880) ; Robinson v. Harris, 73 S. C. 469, 53 S. E. 755 (1906). If ex-
pressly provided for, after-born children will be included, even though the
conveyance be by deed. Mellichamp v. Mellichamp, 28 S. C. 125, 5 S. E.
333 (1888). Conversely, children born after the execution of the will but
before the death of the testator will be excluded if the will so provides.
Beckwith v. McAlister, 165 S. C. 1, 162 S. E. 623 (1932).
143. Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S. C. 227, 57 S. E. 841 (1907) ; James v. James,
189 S. C. 414, 1 S. E. 2d 494 (1939).
144. Wallace v. Taylor, 127 S. C. 121, 120 S. E. 838 (1924).
145. "Of course if children had been in existence when the deed was made
they would have taken with [A] as tenants in common (but not in fee be-
cause there would have been no words of inheritance)." Lide, Circuit judge,
in James v. James, 189 S. C. 414, 417, 1 S. E. 2d 494 (1939). In McIntosh v.
Kolb, 112 S. C. 1, 99 S. E. 356 (1919), the Court apparently found it un-
necessary to determine whether the grantees under such a limitation took in fee
simple, or only for life.
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conditional 146 is not an estate in fee simple, yet after the birth of
children the grantee can obtain an absolute estate by conveying to a
146. For a consideration of the characteristics of the estate in fee simple
conditional see the annotation in 114 A. L. R. 602 (1938); RESTATEmENT,
PROPERTY §§ 68-77. As it pertains to the present discussion, the relevant law
can be summarized as follows:
(1) If no issue is ever born to the grantee in fee simple conditional, the
land will revert to the grantor or his heirs at the death of the grantee. James
v. James, 189 S. C. 414, 1 S. R. 2d 494 (1939) ; Burnett v. Snoddy, 199 S. C.
399, 19 S. R. 2d 904 (1942) ; United States v. 15,883.55 Acres of land, 54 F.
Supp. 849 (W. D. S. C. 1944). Moreover, the land will revert even though
the grantee is survived by issue if the grantee's descendants die out at any
time in the future, unless a conveyance in fee simple has been made by deed
by the grantee after the birth of issue, or by the issue after him. Withers v.
Jenkins, 14 S. C. 597 (1881). RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 76, comment c.
But see Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S. C. 409, 29 S. E. 2d 673 (1944), which may
be a holding that the estate descends to the issue as a fee simple absolute. See
discussion of this case in 9 Year Book of the Selden Society 63 (1947); 2
POWLL, REAL PROPERTY § 195.
(2) After the estate in fee simple conditional has descended to the issue
of the grantee there is authority that such issue have power by deed to convey
in fee simple before any issue is born to them, though if no such conveyance
is made the estate continues as a fee simple conditional. CHALUs, REAr.
PROPERTY 266 (3rd ed.) ; 1 CRuisE, DIGEsT 29, tit. 2, c. 1, § 7; Co. Lirr. 19a
semble; 2 BLAcKSTONE 110 seinble. See the Court's statement of argument
of counsel in Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265, 267 (S. C. 1833). This
principle may be the explanation of the decision in Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S. C.
409, 29 S. E. 2d 673 (1944), though there seems to be no express South Caro-
lina authority on the point. The Restatement of Property apparently does
not consider the question. But see 2 Pow=, PRL PROPERTY § 195, taking
the position that until the issue have children they cannot convey in fee simple.
(3) Even after the birth of issue the land cannot be devised, but descends
to the issue per formam dont. Jones v. Postell, Harper 92 (S. C. 1824);
Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S. C. 545 (1882).
(4) After the birth of issue the grantee can convey by deed in fee simple
and bar both the claim of the issue and the possibility of reverter to the
grantor and his heirs. Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271 (S. C. 1851) ;
Holley v. Still, 91 S. C. 487, 74 S. E. 1065 (1912); Branyan v. Tribble, 109
S. C. 58, 95 S. E. 137 (1918) ; Antley v. Antley, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S. E. 31
(1925). This is true even though the issue do not survive until the time of
the conveyance by the grantee, provided that they were living at the time of
the creation of the estate in fee simple conditional, or were born subsequent
thereto and prior to the conveyance by the grantee. Barksdale v. Gamage, 3
Rich. Eq. 271 (S. C. 1851); Holley v. Still, 91 S. C. 487, 74 S. E. 1065
(1912). See Smith v. Hanna, 215 S. C. 520, 56 S. E. 2d 339 (1949) ; REsTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY § 69, comment c. Similarly, after the birth of issue the
grantee can mortgage the land. Bonds v. Hutchison, 199 S. C. 197, 18 S. E.
2d 661 (1942). Further, it is liable for his debts, even if not reduced to judg-
ment during his life. Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S. C. 545 (1882).
(5) If the conveyance by the grantee in fee simple conditional is made be-
fore the birth of issue the conveyance bars the claim of the issue subsequently
born, but if the issue dies in the life of the parent th land reverts to the
grantor or his heirs. See Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271, 279 (S. C.
1851); Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S. C. 227, 231, 57 S. E. 841 (1907).
(6) If the issue is born subsequent to the conveyance by the grantee in fee
simple conditional and the issue survive the parent, dicta in certain South
Carolina cases would seem to indicate that the prior conveyance bars the pos-
sibility of reverter to the grantor or his heirs as well as the claim of the issue.
See, among other cases, Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271, 279 (S. C.
1851); Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S. C. 227, 231, 57 S. E. 841 (1907). This
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third party and then taking a reconveyance, thus destroying the con-
dition attached to the original estate.
147
CHAPTEI VI.
So THE TITLE Is BAD!
Thus far we have been concerned with the common law requirement
of words of inheritance for an inter vivos conveyance of an estate
in fee simple, and what language constitutes a sufficient compliance
with the requirement in South Carolina. This chapter is concerned
with the problem of a title either admittedly bad, or so doubtful that
the title examiner does not feel justified in passing it. In the discus-
sion that follows, it is assumed that the title is defective, and that
corrective action is necessary before a purchase can be advised. It
is further assumed that no corrective deed can be obtained, either
because the necessary parties cannot be found, or because they are
unwilling to make such a conveyance. Under these circumstances,
what can be done to cure the title?
Adverse Possession and Presumption of a Grant
If the defective deed is some distance back in the chain of title,
there is always the possibility that time has rectified the error. In
South Carolina the statute of limitations prescribed for the acquisi-
tion of title to land by adverse possession is ten years. 148 Before
seizing upon the statute as a panacea curing all omissions of words
of inheritance in deeds more than ten years old, however, a number
of factors must be considered.
The first problem is the adverse character of the possession for
the statutory period. Suppose that in 1942, A made a deed of a lot
and dwelling "to B forever." Suppose further that B immediately
went into possession and has been occupying and claiming it con-
would seem to be an alternative ground for the decision in Powers v. Bull-
winkle, 33 S. C. 293, 11 S. E. 971 (1890). However, the point is not free
from doubt since the orthodox view is that where the conveyance by the
grantee is made before the birth of issue, the land reverts to the creator of
the estate in fee simple conditional or his heirs upon any subsequent failure
of the lineal descendants of the grantee, even though the issue survive the
parent. Co. LiT. 19a; RzsTATEmNT, PROPZRTY § 70, comment b.
(7) The possibility of reverter may be released to the tenant in fee simple
conditional by the grantor or his heirs, thus making the estate a fee simple
absolute. Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S. C. 227, 57 S. E. 841 (1907). See Adams
v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265, 278 (S. C. 1833) ; Pearse v. Killian, McM. Eq. 231,
234 (S. C. 1841) ; Vaughan v. Langford, 81 S. C. 282, 285, 62 S. E. 316 (1908).
147. See note 146 (4), mepra.
148. S. C. CODE oF LAws §§ 10-124, 10-126, 10-127, 10-2421 (1952). See
also § 10-129, the forty year statute.
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tinuously as his absolute property. In 1952, has B acquired title
by adverse possession? Under the facts as given he has if during
the ten year period A has had a cause of action in ejectment to re-
cover possession of the land. But during the ten year period has A
had any cause of action against B? While not conveying an estate
in fee simple, yet the deed clearly gave B a life estate, and A as the
reversioner has no right to possession -antil after the death of B.
Thus it would seem that there can be no adverse possession by B
against A. 14 9 Nor, it seems, can the statute run against A in favor
of a grantee from B during B's life, even though the conveyance
by B purports to be in fee simple.' 50
Further, it must be borne in mind that in South Carolina adverse
possessions may not be tacked except by ancestor and heir to make
out the statutory period, even though there is privity between the
successive adverse holders.15 ' For example, suppose that B is in
adverse possession of land for nine years, and then conveys by either
deed or devise' 5 2 to C, who holds for two more years. Even though
149. 3 Sums, FuTu INTZRESTS § 779; 1 AuwcAw LAW Ov PROPRTY
§ 4.113; RESTATsmZT, PROPERTY § 222, comments f, g. But in Breland v.
O'Neal, 88 Miss. 449, 40 So. 865 (1906), it apparently was held that adverse
possession immediately commenced to run in favor of a grantee under a deed
intended to convey in fee, but which as a matter of law conveyed only a life
estate. The decision seems questionable.
150. "The law is well settled in this State that the statute of limitations
does not commence to run against a remainderman until the death of the
life tenant, and neither a conveyance by the life tenant, purporting to be in
fee, nor a proceeding in Court to which the remainderman is not a party,
can effect the rights of the remainderman." Mr. Justice Gary in Rice v.
Bamberg, 59 S. C. 498, 507, 38 S. E. 209 (1901), quoted (with punctuation
changes) in Bolt v. Sullivan, 173 S. C. 24, 32, 174 S. E. 491 (1934). See
also Rowell v. Hyatt, 108 S. C. 300, 94 S. . 113 (1917). See Note, 112
A. L. R. 1042 (1938); RESTATzsrNT, FRoP RTY § 222, comment g. The same
reasoning is equally applicable to a presumption of a grant after twenty years
adverse possession, as well as to a claim under the forty year statute, S. C.
Coat OF LAWS § 10-129 (1952).
151. Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28, 26 S. R. 3 (1896); Epperson v. Stan-
sill, 64 S. C. 485, 42 S. E. 426 (1902); Weston v. Morgan, 162 S. C. 177,
160 S. E. 436 (1931); Terwilliger v. Daniels, 222 S. C. 191, 72 S. B. 2d 167
(1952). See the South Carolina cases collected in 2 C. J. 86, n. 46; 2 C. 3. S.
688 n. 75, n. 76. The rationale is that while the heir is in of the ancestor's
possession by operation of law, the new entry of a purchaser by deed or devise
interrupts the continuity of the adverse possession.
152. A qualification of this statement may be necessary where the devise
is to the heir of the testator, in which event the doctrine of worthier title
would apply, the heir taking by descent rather than purchase. Seabrook v.
Seabrook, McM. Eq. 201 (S. C. 1841); Seabrook v. Seabrook, 10 Rich. Eq.
495 (S. C. 1859). 1 Sn&Es, FuTupy INTMRESTS §§ 144-146. In this situation
it appears that tacking would be permitted, despite the purported devise by the
ancestor to the heir. The American Law Institute takes the position that the
doctrine of worthier title as applied to testamentary dispositions is no longer
of any significance in the solution of modem legal problems. RESTATFaNT,
PROPRTY § 314, comment j. In this peculiar context the doctrine may still
have significance in South Carolina law, however.
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the owner has been disseised for a total of eleven years, yet his right
of action will not be barred against C until the latter or his heir
has held the land for a further period of eight years. Thus, if the
land has been conveyed before any one holder has held the land for
ten years, it is possible for twenty or more years to have elapsed
without any one acquiring title by adverse possession.
The South Carolina cases1 5 3 are clear that even in the absence of
statute prescribing a limitation on actions for the recovery of real
property, an adverse possession for twenty years will, analogous to
the prescription of an easement, give title to the land adversely
possessed on the fiction of a presumed lost grant. Where a claimant
of land is proceeding on the theory of the presumption of a grant
rather than adverse possession under the statute, the cases do permit
tacking from grantor to grantee to make out the twenty year period.'4
However, before concluding that any adverse possession of twenty
years results in the presumption of a grant to the adverse claimant,
another factor in the South Carolina law must be considered.
It is clear that a disability of the record title holder or his successor
in title occurring subsequent to the disseisin does not toll the run-
ning of the statute in favor of the adverse possessor.15 5 If at the
time the adverse possession is begun the owner is under no disability,
a subsequent disability existing in him, his heir, devisee, or grantee,
does not extend the ten year period of the statute of limitations.
However, when claiming under the twenty year presumption of a
grant, the cases 15 6 are equally clear that the periods of intervening
disabilities must be deducted in summing up the period necessary
for the presumption of a grant. Thus the mere lapse of twenty
years after an entry upon an owner under no disability does not as-
sure that title by presumption of a grant has been obtained, since
subsequent disabilities may have occurred, the periods of which must
be deducted in determining whether or not the required space of
twenty years has elapsed.
From the above discussion, it is readily apparent that in deter-
mining whether or not lapse of time has cured the omission of words
153. Trustees v. Jennings, 40 S. C. 168, 18 S. E. 257 (1893). See Smith v.
Asbell, 2 Strob. 141 (S. C. 1847); -laithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S. C. 61, 115
S. E. 727 (1923).
154. Thomson v. Peake, 7 Rich. 353 (S. C. 1854) ; Sutton v. Clark, 59 S. C.
440, 38 S. E. 150 (1901). See Haithcock v. Haithcoc1, 123 S. C. 61, 68, 115
S. R. 727 (1923).
155. Satcher v. Grice, 53 S. C. 126, 31 S. E. 3 (1898) ; Sutton v. Clark, 59
S. C. 440, 38 S. E. 150 (1901); Fore v. Berry, 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706
(1913) ; Frady v. Ivester, 129 S. C. 536, 125 S. E. 134 (1924).
156. Lamb v. Crosland, 4 Rich. 536 (S. C. 1851); Massey v. Adams, 3 S. C.
254 (1872).
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of inheritance in a deed many facts not of record must be investi-
gated. If it be determined that the necessary evidence can be ob-
tained, it is clear that in South Carolina both adverse possession
and the presumption of a grant can be asserted affirmatively, and that
afi action may be brought by the adverse claimant against the owner
of the paper title for an adjudication that title is now in the claim-
ant.1
57
Once it is determined that the evidence assures the success of the
action, its prompt institution may be advisable due to the fact that
death or removal of witnesses may later make the establishment of
the necessary facts difficult., Until there is a court decree adjudi-
cating title to be in the adverse claimant, his title is not one of record,
and its marketability is doubtful.
Estoppel
When the owner of land stands idly by, knowing that another is
making substantial expenditures upon the land in the mistaken be-
lief that he is the owner thereof, the true owner will be estopped to
assert his title if he has not seasonably given notice of his right. This
doctrine has been repeatedly'recognized in the South Carolina cases.
158
Possible applications of this principle to situations involving claimants
under deeds omitting words of inheritance are readily apparent.15 9
Suppose the reversioner, knowing of his claim under a deed (either
gratuitous or for value) which fails to convey the fee only because
words of inheritance are omitted, sees the grantee making improve-
ments of such an extensive nature that they would not be made
except under the belief of ownership in fee. Under such circum-
stances it appears that the. reversioner will be estopped to deny the
passage of the fee if he has failed to warn the grantee of his claim.160
However, the making by the grantee of improvements which are
consistent with the ownership of a life estate can have no such
effect.
1 61
157. Harrelson v. Sarvis, 39 S. C. 14, 17 S. E. 368 (1893) ; Busby v. Rail-
road, 45 S. C. 3'12, 23 S. E. 50 (1895) ; Duren v. Kee, 50 S. C. 444, 27 S. E.
875 (1897) ; Brevard v. Fortune, 221 S. C. 117, 69 S. E. 2d 355 (1952). See
Note, 78 A. L. R_ 24, 110 (1932).
158. See, among other cases. Tarrant v. Terry, 1 Bay 239 (S. C. 1792);
Marines v. Goblet, 31 S. C. 153, 9 S. E. 803 (1889) ; Latimer v. Marchbanks,
57 S. C. 267, 35 S. E. 481 (1900) ; Southern Ry. v. -Day, 140 S. C. 388, 138
S. E. 870 (1926); Piedmont and Northern Ry. v. Henderson, 216 S. C. 98,
56 S. E. 2d 740 (1949).
159. See generally, Notes, 76 A. L. R. 304 (1932), 50 A. L. R. 668 (1927).
160. See Sullivan v. Moore, 84 S. C. 426, 65 S. E. 108 (1910).
161. Sullivan v. Moore, note 160, supra.
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It -would seem that an estoppel should result even though the
reversioner was ignorant of his claim at the time that the improve-
ments were made by the grantee. It is true the general rule is stated
to be that a party is not estopped by mere silence and inaction unless
he knew or had reason to know of his right at the time of his silence
and inaction. 162 However, the situation at hand would appear to
be analogous to a parol gift or sale of land, in which case the fact
that the donor or vendor was ignorant of the legal invalidity of the
gift or sale will not prevent the enforcement of the transaction in
equity.
163
Where the reversioner participated in negotiations leading to a
purported sale in fee of the interest of a life tenant, it was held
that the reversioner was estopped to assert his title.M4  The fact
that the reversioner was ignorant of his interest at the time of his
affirmative representations to the purchaser will not prevent the
finding of an estoppel. 165  Whether such an estoppel could result
if the reversioner had actual knowledge of the contemplated sale in
fee but did not participate in the negotiations consummating it is ques-
tionable. If the deed .from the reversioner dearly expressed an
intention to convey a life estate only, it would seem that no such
estoppel could arise. Under such circumstances, the notice afforded
the purchaser by the deed or record of the deed to his grantor would
in most conceivable situations prevent the finding of an estoppel.' 66
If, however, the deed manifests an intention to convey. in fee and
failed to do so only because of the omission of words of inheritance
a court well might hold that the reversioner was estopped 1i he
neglected to give a purchaser from the grantee seasonable notice of
his claim.
167
162. See Chambers v. Bookman, 67 S. C. 432, 454, 46 S. E. 39' (19o3)
Scarborough v. Woodley, 81 S. C. 329, 331, 62 S. E. 405 (1908).
163. As to parol gifts of land, see Knight v. Stroud, 214 S. C. 43. 53
S. E. 2d 72 (1949) ; Note, 2 S. C. L. Q. 185 (1949). As to par.,' sa!es :i .::d
see Note, 101 A. L. R. 923 (1936); Note, 8 Yearbook of the Sedee:. S---.et-
65 (1947).
164. -McMillan v. Hughes, 88 S. C. 296, 70 S. E. 804 (1911 See Jer!:inas
v. Harrison, 33 S. C. 206, 11 S. E. 695 (1890); Chambers -. Rcnkrnar.. 67
S. C. 432, 46 S. E. 39 (1903).
165. "Our conclusion from the foregoing authorities is, that fp'osi' e acts
on the part of the true owner of land, which induce an innocent par.-, t deal
with it as if the title was in another, will estop him, even if he -was ienorant
of his title, and no fraud was actually intended." (Emphasis hr the CourLt)
'Mr. Justice Gary in Chambers v. Bookman, 67 S. C. 432. 4:-. 46 S E. 39
(1903), quoted with slight changes in McMillan v. Hughes. .8 S. C. 296, 301,
70 S. E. 804 (1911).
166. Clark v. Parsons, 69 N. H. 147, 39 A. 898 (1897). Se- Adarmz v.
Adams, 220 S. C. 131, 140, 141, 66 S. E. 2d 809 (1951).
167. "Plaintiff's deed to Mrs. Greer being on record, the laW ]mp,,sed no
duty on the plaintiff to give additional notice to the public of its termi She
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Ref orttion168
Can a deed be reformed in equity to supply omitted words of in-
heritance? The usual opinion held by South Carolina lawyers is that
though a deed for value can be reformed, the reformation of a
gratuitous deed cannot be had. While this opinion probably reflects
the present state of the law in general, in certain contexts it does
not fit the pattern of the adjudicated cases. in one instance 69 the
Court has sanctioned the reformation of a gratuitous deed while in
another 170 it has refused to add words of inheritance to a deed for
which value had been paid. The answer to the question of reforma-
tion, therefore, is somewhat more complex than the customary rule of
thumb indicates.
In the absence of fraud, the ground for the reformation of a deed
omitting words of inheritance is that the parties intended a convey-
ance in fee simple, but due to a mutual mistake failed to accomplish
the intended conveyance. The following passage several times has
been quoted in the cases as declarative of the rule in South Carolina :171
"But before a court of equity will re-form a solemn instrument it
must be shown by evidence which is the most clear and convincing
not simply it was a mistake on the part of one of the parties, but
that it was a mutual mistake, that both parties intended a certain
thing, and that by mistake in the drafting of the paper they did not
get what both parties intended."
That a deed founded upon a valuable consideration can be reformed
is settled law in South Carolina.172 The rule in the State as to the
reformation of voluntary deeds is not so well recognized. The writer
has found but two South Carolina cases1 73 in which the Court has
supplied the omission of words of inheritance in gratuitous deeds.
could rest on the notice afforded by record, unless she knew the defendant or
his grantor was about to purchase the land in good faith in the belief that
he would get a fee simple title. Silence in the face of such knowledge would
be evidence of estoppel." Mr. Justice Woods in Sullivan v. Moore, 84 S. C. 426,
430, 65 S. E. 108 (1910).
168. See generally, Note, 141 A. L. R. 826, 833 (1942); RESTATEPaNT,
PRoPrTY § 36.comment b.
169. Lawrence v. Clark, 115 S. C. 67, 104 S. E. 330 (1920).
170. Jones v. Kelly, 94 S. C. 349, 78 S. R. 17 (1913).
171. Featherstone, Special Judge, in Sullivan v. Moore, 92 S. C. 305, 307,
75 S. E. 497 (1912); quoted with slight changes in Groce v. Benson, 168
S. C. 145, 151, 167 S. E. 151 (1933); Gowdy v. Kelley, 185 S. C. 415, 422,
194 S. E. 156 (1937).
172. Austin v. Hunter, 85 S. C. 472, 67 S. E. 734 (1910); Sullivan v. Moore.
92 S. C. 305, 75 S. R. 497 (1912); Byrd v. O'Neal, 106 S. C. 346, 91 S. E.
293 (1917); Mathis v. Hair, 112 S. C. 320, 99 S. E. 810 (1919).
173. Brock v. O'Dell, 44 S. C. 22, 21 S. E. 976 (1895) ; Lawrence v. Clark,
115 S. C. 67, 104 S. E. 330 (1920).
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The firstl74 can not be regarded as authority, however, as the Supreme
Court refused to consider the question, since the objection that a
court of equity will not reform a gratuitous deed was first raised on
appeal.
The second case175 involved a deed from father to son in considera-
tion of love and affection and five dollars. A reformation was ordered
in favor of a devisee from the son against the heirs of the grantor.
The issue as to the reformation of a voluntary deed was squarely
raised, and the decision was justified on two grounds. First, the
recital of a nominal consideration of five dollars was held to consti-
tute value so as to bring the conveyance within the principle govern-
ing the reformation of deeds executed pursuant to the payment of
a valuable consideration.178 Second, the Court held that treating
the transfer as voluntary, the deed was subject to reformation against
the heirs of the grantor, even though a reformation of a voluntary
deed could not have been decreed against the grantor himself.' 77
In a subsequent case 178 involving a deed reciting a consideration of
one dollar and love and affection, the holding that the recital of a
nominal consideration is basis for reformation was expressly re-
affirmed, though in the particular case a reformation was refused
on the ground that the evidence did not istify such relief.
As to voluntary deeds, therefore, the precedents in South Caro-
lina establish that the Court has power to order a reformation as
against the heirs or devisees of the grantor even though there is no
recital of any nominal consideration in the deed. If there is a recital
of any monetary consideration, no matter how small, the Court's
assimilation of such a conveyance to the principle governing the re-
formation of deeds for value in theory will warrant the reformation
of such a deed against the grantor himself, though this result has
not yet been reached in the cases.
174. Brock v. O'Dell, note 173, supra.
175. Lawrence v. Clark, note 173, supra.
176. The precedents cited by the Court for this holding are South Carolina
cases involving the principle that the recital of a consideration evidences that
a resulting use to the grantor was not intended. Similarly, the recital of a
nominal consideration is sufficient to support a deed operating as a bargain
and sale. Jackson ex dem. Hudson v. Alexander, 3 Johns. 484 (N. Y. 1808),
3 Am. Dec. 517. For cases from other jurisdictions holding that a deed upon
a nominal consideration may be reformed at the instance of the grantee, see
Note, 69 A. L. R. 423, 435 (1930), s. 128 A. L. R. 1299, 1303 (1940).
177. For cases to the same effect from other jurisdictions, see Note, 69
A. L. R. 423,.427 (1930), s. 128 A. L. R. 1299, 1301 (1940). As to the right
of reformation in favor of a subsequent purchaser for value from the donee,
see Note, 89 A. L. R. 1444, 1449 (1934). In Mathis v. Hair, 112 S. C. 320,
99 S. E. 810 (1919), the donee from a grantee for value was allowed a
reformation of the deed to her donor.
178. Groce v. Benson, 168 S. C. 145, 167 S. E. 151 (1933L
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As mentioned above,179 before a reformation can be decreed, clear
and convincing proof must be had that the deed as drawn does not
accomplish the conveyance which was intended by the parties. Just
how is this agreement between the parties to be evidenced?
If the contract of sale is in writing, proof of it is readily available.
Such a contract need not contain the word "heirs," and any language
manifesting that a conveyance in fee simple was intended is suffi-
dent.180
Suppose, however, as is so often the case, the contract was an
oral one, and the defective deed is the only written evidence of the
transaction. In such a case, parol evidence may be introduced as
to the estate intended to- be conveyed.' 8' However, if the grantor
is dead or insane such testimony by the grantee in behalf of himself
or his successor in interest is inadmissible over objection in an ac-
tion by or against the heir, devisee, assignee, personal representative
or committee of the grantor.182 This disability does not extend to
the testimony of third parties, and the conveyancer employed by a
grantor was allowed to testify as to his mistake in the drafting of
the instrument in a suit for reformation against the grantor's heirs. 183
Even though the contract of sale was not in writing and testimony
is not available as to the negotiations between the parties, the deed
itself may evidence an intention to convey in fee, depending upon
the draftsman's haphazard choice of language. In a number of cases
184
it has been held that the inclusion of a warranty to the grantee and
his heirs is a circumstance indicating that a conveyance in fee was
179. Note 171, supra.
180. Phillips v. Swank, 120 Pa. 76, 13A. 712 (1888). 4 KENT 7.
181. Parol evidence as to the estate intended to be conveyed was admitted
in Austin v. Hunter, 85 S. C. 472, 67 S. E. 734 (1910); Sullivan v. Moore,
92 S. C. 305, 75 S. E. 497 (1912) ; Byrd v. O'Neal, 106 S. C. 346, 91 S. E.
293 (1917). In Jones v. Swearingen, 42 S. C. 58, 19 S. E. 947 (1894), the
Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of the circuit judge to permit the grantee
of a deed for value to introduce testimony to show that the parties intended
a conveyance in fee. Apparently this was on the ground that mistake had
not been pleaded, nor reformation sought in the lower court.
182. S. C. CoDE or LAWS § 26-402 (1952); Jones v. Kelly, 94 S. C. 349,
78 S. E. 17 (1913). The word "assignee" in the statute includes a grantee
of the decedent. Palachucola Club v. Withington, 159 S. C. 446, 157 S. E.
621 (1931). In Cantey v. Whitaker, 17 S. C. 527 (1882), it was held that
the protection of the statute does not extend to a subsequent grantee from the
immediate grantee of the decedent. For a recent case reaching the same re-
sult, see Taylor v. Cox, 218 S. C. 488, 63 S. E. 2d 470 (1951).
183. Lawrence v. Clark, 115 S. C. 67, 104 S. R. 330 (1920). The opinion dis-
closes no objection to this testimony, but it would appear competent despite
objection. See McLaurin v. Newton, 183 S. C. 379, 191 S. E. 59 (1937).
184. Austin v. Hunter, 85 S. C. 472, 67 S. E. 734 (1910) ; Sullivan v. Moore,
92 S. C. 305, 75 S. E. 497 (1912) ; Byrd v. O'Neal, 106 S. C. 346, 91 S. E.
293 (1917) ; Mathis v. Hair, 112 S. C. 320, 99 S. E. 810 (1919).
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intended. A relatively early case 85 extended this principle even
further in holding that a warranty to the grantee forever instead of
to the grantee and his heirs was sufficient evidence of an executory
contract for the sale of the land in fee, and that the heirs of the
grantor therefore had no interest.
Certain dicta in the cases in the first years of the present century
indicate that under the leadership of an aggressive and practical
minded judge the Court very nearly broke free from the shackling re-
quirement of words of inheritance without benefit of legislative dis-
pensation. It is an interesting conjecture that had Mr. Justice
Woods continued on the Supreme Court of South Carolina instead
of proceeding to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the former Court
under his intellectual dominance might have adopted the escape
several times suggested by him.
In an opinion affirming the reformation of a deed, Mr. Justice
Woods points out the facts of life which a too legalistic approach to
the question overlooks :186 "Unless the Courts must look away from
the obvious, they know that it is probable almost to the point of cer-
tainty that in writing a deed no layman would express the convey-
ance of a life estate by the mere omission of the word 'heirs' in the
premises and the habendunm when using it in the warranty, and that
no lawyer would do so except one wholly possessed with the spirit
of priggishness." In a later case18 7 where his brethren could find
no intrinsic evidence in the deed of an intention to convey the fee,
Justice Woods attacked the common law rule with even more de-
vastating logic: "In construing deeds as in the performance of all
other judicial functions, the Court must take judicial notice of the
manners and customs of the people whose writings they try to under-
stand; and clear conviction arising from taking into -account such
manners and customs surely is as good as any other conviction. Hav-
ing in view the manners of the plain people of the country, it is
inconceivable that any man without legal training would write such
a deed as is now before us when his intention was to convey a life
estate ... So universal is the custom to use the words 'for life' or
similar words when the intention is to convey a life estate and not
a fee, that I venture to think that there will be no dissent from the
statement that the attempt to limit to a life estate is never attempted
without the use of such words either by lawyers or laymen, unless
the purpose be to entrap or deceive. In view of these facts, can there
185. Johnson v. Gilbert, 13 Rich. Eq. 42 (S. C. 1866).
186. Sullivan v. Moore, 92 S. C. 305, 308, 75 S. E. 497 (1912).
187. Jones v. Kelly, 94 S. C. 349, 357, 78 S. E. 17 (1913).
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be a doubt that courts of equity should relieve against the injustice
which arises from the absurd rule of common law that the use of
the word 'heirs' is necessary to create a fee whenever they can pos-
sibly do so without interfering with the rights of innocent purchasers
or creditors ?"
In the writer's opinion the reasoning of MT. Justice Woods is
unassailable. The reformation of a deed to embody omitted words
of inheritance stands on entirely different grounds from the common
law requirement of such words to convey a fee. The reformation of
a deed is a problem of construction in arriving at what is intended
by the language employed in the conveyance, as opposed to the rule
of law which arbitrarily defeats intention. While a rule of law is
absolute unless abrogated by statute or directly disavowed by de-
cision, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Woods, a rule of construction
quite properly can and should change with the "manners and cus-
toms of the people,"'188 since such a rule seeks to determine what
the parties intended. In determining what the language employed in
a deed actually meant to the parties, it would seem that the passage
of forty years has further confirmed the accuracy of Mr. Justice
Woods' observation that when the intention is to convey less than an
estate in fee, that intention is unequivocally expressed rather than
indirectly indicated by the omission of words of inheritance.
Since the Act of 1824189 the rule of construction as to wills has
been that a devise of land is presumed to be in fee simple unless the
language employed indicates either expressly or impliedly that a lesser
estate was intended. It is submitted that in determining whether
or not reformation of a deed should be granted, the application of the
same rule as a rule of construction in determining the intention of
the parties should be made, since, as pointed out by justice Woods,
the universal practice both among laymen and lawyers bears out the
justice of the presumption. If this course suggested by Justice
Woods had been adopted, for all practical purposes the common law
requirement of words of inheritance in inter vivos conveyances would
today be a dead letter in South Carolina. Such rule unequivocally
applied in several cases would have settled the law that a deed omit-
ting words of inheritance in equity conveys an estate in fee simple,
and with certainty of decision assured litigation on the subject would
no longer be necessary for the clearing of titles. Such a rule would
validate all deeds omitting words of inheritance except the almost non-
existent case where a reformation is sought against the grantor him-
188. Jones v. Kelly, 94 S. C. 349, 357, 78 S. E. 17 (1913).
189. S. C. CoDm or LAws § 19-232 (1952) ; note 6, supra.
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self rather than against his heirs or devisee, and the deed contains
no recital of a nominal consideration.
That the Court has not yet embraced the above solution is readily
apparent in subsequent decisions. Where a grantor declared in a
deed to his son for one dollar and love and affection, "I do hereby
settle and permanently fix the right and title . . . in and upon the
said B and his children . . . and I do hereby bind myself, my heirs
. . . to warrant and forever defend . . . unto the said B and chl-
dren . .. ," the unanimous Court was unable to find conviction that
the grantor really intended to convey the fee rather than a life es-
tate.190 Judged solely by this case it would appear that in South
Carolina the "clear and convincing" evidence which will warrant the
reformation of a deed is an even higher standard than the persuasion
"beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases, for men have been
hanged on far less moral certainty of proof.
One of the latest cases 191 involved a deed in consideration of one
dollar and love and affection, conveying the property to the grantor's
daughter "during her natural life and at her death . . . to become the
absolute property of my grandson K." The Court apparently con-
ceded the obvious fact that the deed disqlosed an intention to convey
in fee. However, reformation was refused on the ground that there
was no evidence of an antecedent agreement between the parties
which the deed as written failed to effectuate because of a mutual
mistake. Considering the Court's rationale, it is of course true that
there can be no reformation on grounds of mutual mistake unless
there has been a mistake, and unless the instrument can be related
to some mutual intention of the parties, it can not be said that there
has been a mistake which will warrant the intervention of a court of
equity. Recognition of this principle seems no solution of the case,
however, since it is difficult to see why the deed itself is not sufficient
evidence of the agreement between the parties.
The execution and delivery of the deed certainly evidenced the
intention of the grantor to convey in fee, as apparently the Court
conceded. Why does not the acceptance of the deed by the grantee
evidence his intention to arcept a conveyance in fee, thus furnish-
ing the required mutuality of agreement? Even though extraneous
proof of the antecedent agreement be lacking, as pointed out by Mr.
190. Groce v. Benson, 168 S. Q. 145, 167 S, E. 151 (1933).
191. Gowdy v. Kelley, 185 S. C. 415, 194 S. E. 156 (1937).
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Justice Woods, 192 the terms of the deed finnish convincing proof of
the intention of the parties. There is no rule of law which says that
the agreement must antedate the deed a day or even an hour, and
delivery and acceptance of a deed evidencing an intention to convey
in fee certainly shows that at the moment of the conveyance the par-
ties had agreed on a common objective which through mutual mistake
they failed to effectuate.19
No South Carolina case adopting this view has been found,193a and
in the cases1 94 where reformation has been decreed there has been at
least a nominal tender of extraneous "proof" of the antecedent agree-
ment, though at times such proof has been tenuous to the point of
evanescence. Possibly the real dividing line between reformation
without "clear and convincing" extraneous evidence of the antecedent
agreement, and the refusal of such reformation, lies in the profes-
sion's folklore that the Court will reform a conveyance for value
where it will not reform one for a nominal consideration. As pre-
viously mentioned, the Court has in one case195 squarely faced the
issue in granting reformation of a deed supported by a purely nominal
consideration. Yet there the extraneous proof of the antecedent
agreement was unusually strong, the draftsman of the deed testifying
as to the instructions given him by the deceased grantor, and as to
his own mistake in the drafting of the limitation. In other cases 9 6
involving gratuitous conveyances the Court has, even while reaffirm-
ing its power of reformation in such cases, refused relief for the
ostensible reason that the evidence of iistake did not attain the re-
quired degree of certainty. Where value has been paid for the con-
veyance, the Court has been quick to reach the judicial conviction
necessary before a reformation will be ordered. The explanation may
lie in a tacit assumption that while a reformation should be granted
192. "But leaving out of view all other testimony, it seems to me that the
deed furnishes on its face evidence clear and convincing that the intention
was to convey a fee simple and not a life estate." Mr. Justice Woods, dis-
senting, in Jones v. Kelly, 94 S. C. 349, 357, 78 S. E. 17 (1913).
193. A deed omitting words of inheritance may be reformed to conform with
the intention of the parties to convey in fee simple, even though the only evi-
dence of such intention appears from the deed itself. Sampson v. Mludge, 13
Fed. 260 (C. C., Mass. 1882); Banks v. Ripley, [1940] Ch. 719. Cf. Sullivan
v. Latimer, 38 S. C. 417, 420, 17 S. E. 221 (1893), where a deed was reformed
by adding a seal, solely upon the intrinsic evidence of the instrument. The
Circuit Judge had denied reformation because there was no extrinsic evi-
dence of the intention of the parties.
193a. Possibly the relatively early case, Johnson v. Gilbert, note 15, supra,
should be excepted from this statement.
194-. See notes 169, 172, supra.
195. Lawrence v. Clark, note 169, supra.
196. Groce v. Benson, 168 S. C. 145, 167 S. E. 151 (1933); Gowdy v.
Kelley, 185 S. C. 415, 194 S. E. 156 (1937).
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in favor of a grantee for value, such reformation in favor of a
donee as against the donor's heirs is at least unkind if not unjust.
No matter how clearly the donor has indicated his desire, he has not
complied with common law technicalities, and a court of equity is
chary of evading legal precedents in favor of a mere volunteer. A
far cry from the impatient dislike with which Mr. Justice Woods
viewed the requirement of words of inheritance some thirty years
earlier, 197 but later decisions have tended to retreat to the faith of
the fathers.
As to the valuable consideration which in general has been the sole
incantation invoking equitable relief in South Carolina, the Court
has declared that "[f]ull price standing alone has never been held
to be conclusive that it was the intention to convey a fee."198  How-
ever, the fact that reasonable value has been paid has been treated
by the Court as a factor strongly indicating that a fee was intended, 199
and this fact, in conjunction with other extraneous evidence of the
agreement, almost invariably2 00 has been held conclusive on the issue
of the propriety of a reformation. Conversely, where the grantee
had never paid the full consideration, and had successfully pleaded
the statute of limitations in a prior action for the balance of the pur-
chase price, it was held that no reformation could be had.
2 01
A suit for the reformation of a deed is one in equity, and neither
party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.2 02 While laches
;s available as a defense, if the grantee or his successor has acted
promptly upon discovery of the mistake, there is no bar in equity.20
In two cases2 04 reformations were ordered in suits brought more
than fifty years after execution and delivery of the deeds, the Court
finding no evidence of laches.
Reformation of a deed cannot be had if such action will impair the
197. See p. 362, supra.
193. Jones v. Kelly, 94 S. C. 349, 353, 78 S. E. 17 (1913).
199. Austin v. Hunter, 85 S. C. 472, 67 S. E. 734 (1910) ; Sullivan v. Moore,
92 S. C. 305, 75 S. R. 497 (1912) ; Byrd v. O'Neal, 106 S. C. 346, 91 S. E. 293
(1917) ; Mathis v. Hair, 112 S. C. 320, 99 S. E. 810 (1919).
200. In Jones v. Kelly, note 198, supra, the fact that value had been paid
was held insufficient evidence of an intention to convey in fee.
201. Burroughs v. Floyd, 112 S. C. 106, 98 S. E. 850 (1919).
202. Wolf v. Hayes, 161 S. C. 293, 159 S. E. 620 (1931).
203, Byrd v. O'Neal, 106 S. C. 346, 91 S. E. 293 (1917) ; Mathis v. Hair,
112 S. C. 320, 99 S. E. 810 (1919). In the first cited case the Court quoted
with approval (106 S. C. at p. 351) the following passage from Babb v.
Sullivan, 43 S. C. 436, 441, 21 S. R. 277 (1895) : "Laches connotes not only
undue lapse of time, but also negligence, and opportunity to have acted sooner;
and all three factors must be satisfactorily shown before the bar in equity
is complete." See Note, 106 A. L. R. 1338 (1937).
204. Byrd Y. O'Neal, note 203, spra; Mathis v. Hair, note 203, supra.
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rights of subsequent bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers for value
without notice. However, if the subsequent purchaser or encum-
brancer for value had notice of the equity of reformation, he occupies
no better position than his vendor or mortgagor.
20 5
What circumstances are sufficient to charge with notice a subse-
quent purchaser or encumbrancer for value is a question of fact to
be determined in each case. Suppose that A, for valuable considera-
tion, by duly recorded deed conveys land to B "in fee simple." At
law the deed conveys B only a life estate, and yet it seems clear that
a subsequent purchaser of the legal reversion from A would be un-
able to establish that he took without notice of B's equity of reforma-
tion. It would further seem that even where the intention is not
so expressly spelled out, yet if the deed affords intrinsic evidence
of an intention to convey in fee sufficient to warrant a reformation
of the deed as against the grantor, a subsequent purchaser from him
with actual or constructive notice of the terms of the deed will not
be protected.208
In summary, while the precedents give the Court ample justification
for reforming gratuitous deeds as well as deeds for value, the grant-
ing of such relief has been limited almost exclusively to cases where
value has been paid. Since the device of reformation affords the
most practicable escape from an admittedly outworn rule of law, it is
to be hoped that future cases will evince a less tender regard for
the fiction that unless a grantor has used the word "heirs," it is a
violent assumption to presume that he really intended a conveyance
in fee simple rather than a life estate.
CHAPTR VII.
CONCLUSION
As pointed out in the introduction, the primary aim of this article
is to furnish a practical guide for title examiners on questions in-
volving the effect of the omission of words of inheritance in inter
vivos conveyances of land. If in addition it has served the further
purpose of engendering a suspicion that such learning in modem
South Carolina law is an anachronism bordering on the nonsensical,
the writer will experience no chagrin.
If the function of land conveyancing in a modern society is to
205. See Note, 44 A. L. R. 78 (1926), s. 102 A. L. R. 825 (1936).
206. See Sampson v. Mudge, 13 Fed. 260 (C. C. Mass. 1882). But cf. At-
lantic Coast Lumber Co. v. Langston Lumber Co., 128 S. C. 7, 122 S. E. 395
(1924), holding that a deed erroneously recorded without words of inheritance
is constructive notice only of a life estate.
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facilitate the transfer of the basic wealth of the community in a
simple and certain manner, free from petty questions causing time-
consuming and expensive litigation, the overwhelming majority of
the English speaking world is right in abolishing the requirement
of words of inheritance.207 On the other hand, if its function is at
all cost to preserve legal museum pieces antedating the discovery
of America, thought of any change is a heresy to be eschewed. To
be strictly consistent, however, the whole fabric of Coke's time
should be restored to its pristine purity, and some legal Cato the
Censor should introduce bills repealing the acts which abolish the
requirement of words of inheritance in devises,2 08 the indefinite failure
of issue construction, 209 the destruction of contingent remainders by
tortious feoffment, 2 10 the Rule in Shelley's Case,21 ' and many other
acts which have committed the State to heresy.
While conservationism and aversion to change are the hereditary
virtues of the conveyancing craft, no one consciously argues that the
State's present conveyancing practices should be maintained merely
out of deference to the shades of Littleton, Coke, and Blackstone.
The accepted rationalization is that since the law is well settled and
known to everyone, why bother to change it; that to do so will only
unsettle the precedents and breed confusion and litigation where all
is now certainty and tranquility.2 12 This is not a new argument, as
witness the eulogy .of the rule by Preston, the great English con-
veyancer, writing in the late eighteenth century:213 "Every person
who has had an opportunity of observing the salutary effects flow-
ing from a rule, which prescribes, that certain technical words only
should have a particular signification and import, will congratulate
the profession and those in whose interest and peace he takes any
concern, that the rule is adopted." '
The only answer that can be made to such a beautifully phrased
encomium is the prosaic one that experience has not justified the
hypothesis. In South Carolina prior to the Act of 1824214 establish-
ing the construction that a devise of lnd is presumed to be in fee
unless an express or implied intention to create a lesser interest is
207.. See notes 1, 2, .rpra.
208. S. C. CODE op LAWS § 19-232 (1952).
209. S. C. CODE OF LAws § 57-3 (1952).
210. S.C CODE or LAws § 57-4 (1952).
211. S. C. CODE or LAWS § 57-2 (1952).
212. See the minority opinion of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform of the South Carolina Bar Association, on a recommendation that
legislation be enacted abolishing the requirement of words of inheritance in
deeds of land. 1 S. C. L. Q. 329, 330 (1949).
213. 2 PRESTON, ESTATES 67.
214. S. C.'CODE or LAws § 19-232 (1952) ; note 6, supra.
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found, a frequent question was whether or not the language of a
devise was sufficient to create an estate in fee. A study of the re-
ports will show that the passage of the Act has effectively ended
the problem, rather than caused the flood of litigation which such
a common sense rule is reputed to engender. No explanation as to
why this result would not follow the adoption of the same rule for
inter vivos conveyances has been advanced.
Of course, the belief that the law is at present dear and settled
is a myth akin to the fabled activities of the stork as an accoucheur.
If this article has not furnished sufficient examples of doubtful
questions, any experienced title examiner can supply offhand a half
dozen limitations which 'will defy any lawyer in South Carolina to
give an authoritative answer as to whether they pass a fee or only a
life estate. Only the Supreme Court knows the answers, and almost
every case necessarily involves an expensive and time-consuming ap-
peal to that tribunal.
The reason for the uncertainty of the law is readily apparent. In-
herently, the rule requiring words of inheritance is a harsh and sense-
less thing, and any modern judge with a spark of feeling desires
to escape it when confronted with cases where common sense and
ordinary human feeling do not jibe with mediaeval legal ritualism.
The traditional common law penalty of forfeiture of estate for the
trifling misdemeanor of employing a layman or incompetent lawyer
as conveyancer has in many instances proven too great for the Court
to accept, a fact which in large part accounts for much of the present
uncertainty in the law. A rule of law which is having the props cut
from under it by judicial attrition is hardly one to cite as an example
of beautiful certainty in the law.
That the Court is in general hostile to the rule has been evinced in
the opinions of the last fifty years.2 15 However, stare decisis is
215. "This is the rule of the common law from which the Courts can not
escape, though its operation nearly always results in the injustice of defeat-
ing the intention of the parties. The rule serves generally as a snare to those
unlearned in technical law, and it would be difficult to suggest any reason for
its continued existence; but it has been so long established in this State that
the Courts can not now overrule the cases laying it down without imperilling
vested rights .... It was made inapplicable to wills by the first section of the
Act of 1824. . . . The General Assembly has not, however, seen fit to extend
this statute to deeds, and the Courts are powerless to do so." Mr. Justice
Woods in Sullivan v. Moore, 84 S. C. 426, 428, 65 S. E. 103 (1910) ; quoted
with slight changes in McMillan v. Hughes, 88 S. C. 296, 299, 70 S. E. 804
(1911) ; Holder v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 248, 91 S. E. 97 (1917).
"It is a strange survival of a feudal technicality that the Courts are without
power to give effect to the plain purpose, as distinguished from the legal inten-
tion, of the parties. The legislature alone can give relief from this thorn in the
flesh. The word 'heirs' is not used, and the Courts are powerless to carry out
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justifiably sought in an age when certain courts have at times gone
overboard in rewriting the law to accord with personal whim and
predilection. No thinking lawyer, particularly one concerned with
dispositions of property, can have other than respect and regard for
the reassuring stability of decision which the Court of South Caro-
lina has displayed throughout its long judicial history.
While repeatedly announcing its disapproval of the rule, the Court
has expressed a reluctance to change it by decision, and has declared
that the rule must be abrogated by statute. Hence the issue has
squarely confronted the Bar, and here the Bar has been derelict in
revising the law to meet modem needs.
The responsibility for the continuance of the rule squarely rests
upon the lawyers of the State. In such a technical field of law, the
Court's remark that "the law making body of the State have not seen
fit"2 16 to change the rule is only a euphemism politely veiling the
unpleasant truth that in this instance the lawyers have failed to meet
their responsibility to the citizenry of the community. For how
can there be a popular referendum on such an issue as words of
inheritance in inter vivos conveyances of land when the only laymen
who have heard of the rule are the unfortunates who have run afoul
of it? Such legislation must be instituted-by lawyers, just as the
Rule in Shelley's Case,2 17 the indefinite failure of issue construc-
tion,218 and other such technical doctrines have been changed by
members of the profession rather than by mass revolt.
It is submitted that the rule should be abrogated by a statute simi-
lar to that abolishing the necessity of words of inheritance in de-
vises.219 As hereinbefore mentioned,220 while it is probable that
such a statute might in many instances be given a retroactive effect,
the statutes adopted in England22 a and the majority of the states220b
have not been made retroactive. Hence, any legislation adopted in
the purpose of the parties . . . ." Mr. Justice Fraser in Son v. Shealy, 112
S. C. 312, 318, 99 S. E. 825 (1919)."The Legislature by its Act of 1824 declared that it should no longer be
necessary to insert words of inheritance in a will in order to carry the fee.
In all the hundred years which have passed since the passage of that Act, the
lawmaking body of the state have not seen fit to adopt similar legislation in
regard to deeds. It is hnanifest that Courts should be cautious in enforcing
a rule which in effect does that which the Legislature has not done." Mr.
Justice Bonham in Groce v. Benson, 168 S. C. 145, 152, 167 S. E. 151 (1933),
quoted in Gowdy v. Kelley, 185 S. C. 415, 420, 194 S. . 156 (1937).
216. See note 215, supra.
217. See note 211, supra.
218. See note 209, supra.
219. See note 214, .supra.
220. See note 5, upra.
220a. See note 1, supra.
220b. See notes 2, 5, mupra.
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South Carolina quite possibly may be made applicable only to deeds
executed after the passage of such an act.
The Rule in Shelley's Case was abolished in 1924,2 1 but problems
under the rule since have arisen and will arise for years to come,
due to the fact that it is inapplicable to instruments executed before
October 1, 1924. Must the same be true of deeds executed before
the enactment of a statute abolishing the requirement of words of
inheritance in deeds executed after the passage of such a statute?
It is here that the judiciary can make its contribution in an area
where the legislature may be doubtful of its power to act. As pointed
out in the discussion of reformation of deeds,22 " the precedents are
ample to justify the reformation of deeds for value and of gratuitous
deeds reciting a nominal consideration. All that is needed to assure
the certainty needed by the title examiner is the crystallization of the
constructional rule that it will be presumed the parties meant to con-
vey in fee, unless the language employed in the deed, or convincing
extraneous evidence, indicates that a life estate was intended.
The establishment of such a rule will be a simple matter involv-
ing no disavowal of the principle of stare decisis, for the question
is one of construction, a matter of evidence rather than one of sub-
stantive law. No repudiation of a rule of law will be necessary, a step
which in a good cause the Court did not hesitate to take in holding
that "issue" and "children" may be words of limitation when used in
a deed. 2 s3 Once the problem has been abandoned for the future by
statute, the Court may well elect to end it once and for all by de-
cision.P
4
The unequivocal affirmation of the doctrine that a deed without
words of inheritance in equity conveys a fee would make the clear-
ing of titles the mere matter of a perfunctory circuit court decree.
Costly and time-consuming appeals would be unnecessary once it was
known that the Supreme Court would stand squarely behind such de-
crees. The title examiner would be able to announce with confidence
the state of the title in limitations omitting the word "heirs." No less
221. See note 211, supra.
222. See p. 359, supra.
223. See p. 349, et seq., supra.
224. This was the course adopted in North Carolina as to deeds omitting
words of inheritance executed prior to the Act of 1879, abolishing the re-
quirement of such words. That even gratuitous deeds may be reformed to
embody omitted words of inheritance, see Vickers v. Leigh, 104 N. C. 248,
10 S. E. 308 (1889); Moore v. Quince, 109 N. C. 85, 13 S. E. 872 (1891) ;
Rackley v. Chesnutt, 110 N. C. 262, 14 S. R. 750 (1892); Whichard v. White-
hurst, 181 N. C. 79, 106 S. E. 463 (1921).
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important would be an end to the cases where the intention of grantors
has been thwarted needlessly because of the fiction that such inten-
tion has not been expressed.
The adoption of the above suggestions will not achieve the millen-
nium in South Carolina, for death, taxes, and the defective title will
be with us always. However, such action will effect a long overdue
reform, and bring the State's practice in accord with that in other
modern Anglo-American jurisdictions. It is by such isolated small
gains that the few rough edges of the State's basically sound land law
eventually will be eliminated.
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